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to his death was prejudicial error, where the connection of such
occurrences with the defendant and with the crime charged
was shown only by a theory of the prosecution based on circumstantial evidence, and where the evidence relating to the
crime charged was also purely circumstantial.
[3] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes.-As a general rule,
a defendant in a criminal prosecution can be tried for no offense
other than that charged in the indictment or information; evidence of collateral independent crimes is not admissible.

[4] ld.-Evidence-Other Crimes-When Admissible.-Evidenee
of other crimes may be admitted when it tends directly to
establish the crime charged by proving a material fact, where
it is part of the res gestae, or where it helps to disclose Illotive,
intent, premeditation, guilty knowledge, malice, or a common
plan or scheme.
[5] ld.-Evidence-Other Orimes-Rules Governing Admissibility.
-The trial court should be guided by the rule that proof of
other crimes is to be received with extreme caution, and if its
connection with .the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular
guilt.
[6] Homicide-Evidence-Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for
murder, evidence of events relating to an assault on the deceased some six weeks prior to his death failed to satisfy the
requirements that a collateral offense cannot be put in evidence
without proof that the accused was concerned in its commission, and that there must be identity of person or crime, scienter, intent, system, or the like, showing that the person who
committed the one crime must have committed the other, where
the evidence introduced was insufficient to create more .than a
mere suspicion that the defendant might have been the deceased's assailant on the prior occasion.
[7] ld.-Instructions-Evidence-Otlier Orimes.-In a prosecution
,for murder, an instruction that evidence with regard to an
assault on .the deceased some six weeks prior to his death was
to be considered only as it wight relate to the relationship
of defendant to the deceased, premeditation, malice or motive,
was erroneous and misleading and invaded the province of the
jury in not being qualified by a statement that before the
jurors could consider the telltimony for the specified purposes,
they must conclude that the deceased was assaulted on the
prior occasion, where the evidence did not tend to prove the
elements referred to in the instruction.

[3] See 8 Oal.Jur. 58; 13 Oa1.Jur. 703; 20 Am.Jur. 287.
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[8] Or?n inal Law:- Evidence - Other Orimes - Degree or SufficIency of E~I~ence.-Where evidence of a prior offense is
pr?perly admISSIble under the exceptions to the general rule
It IS not necessary to prove all of the elements of that offens~
beyond a reas?nabl~ doubt, as would be the case were the defendant standmg trIal for it as well as for the crime charged.
The proof? ~owe~er, must be sufficient to arouse more than
m~re SUSpICIOn; It must. afford substantial evidence that the
prIOr offense was in fact committed by the defendant.
[9]

Id.-Evid~nce-Othe.r Orimes-Degree or Sufficiency of Evi~ence.-:-CIrcum~tantI~1 proof of a crime charged cannot be
mtermmgled. WIth circumstantial proof of suspicious prior
occurrenc.es m such manner that it reacts as a psychological
factor, WIth the result that the proof of the crime charged is
used to bolster up the theory or foster suspicion that defendant must have committed the prior act, and the conclusion
that he must have committed the prior act is then used to
strengthen the theory and induce the conclusion that he must
also have committed the crime charged.

i
;. .

APPE~L (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a Judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County and from an order denying a new trial. Arthur
Crum, JUdge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction reversed.
John W. Preston for Appellant.

f i
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~
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: i:

Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards,
Deputy Attorney General, John F. Dockweiler, District Attorney, ~red N. Howser, District Attorney, John Barnes and
W. E. SImpson, Deputies District Attorney, fOlr Respondent.
. CARTER, J.-Upon evidence entirely circumstantial a
Jury. f~und defendant Oscar L. Al'tJertson guilty of the crime
of killIng John Kmetz by means of poisoned vitamin caps~es, and returned a verdict of murder in the first degree
WIthout recommendation. Motion for new trial was denied
and a judgment imposing the death penalty is automatically
before thi~ court for review (Pen. Code, sec. 1239).
. Ten. asslgnm,:nts .of error ~re argued in appellant's openIng brIef, relatIng In the maIn to the sufficiency of the evi[8] See 20 Am.Jur. 299.
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dence, rulings on admission of evidence, misconduct of the
district attorney, and error in charging the jury. From the
nature of the evidence and its doubtful sufficiency, it is
obvious that if error was committed by the trial court which
materially affected the substantial rights of the defendant,
and which may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice,
such error must be considered prejudicial and ground for
reversal. (People v. Dail, 22 Ca1.2d 642, 650 [140 P.2d 828] ;
People v. Silver, 16 Ca1.2d 714, 723 [108 P.2d 4].) For that
reason it is necessary to detail the facts with particularity.
Albertson was a blacksmith by trade. He and Mrs. Albertson, to whom he had been married for twenty years,
were active and apparently devout members of the Seventh
Day Adventist Church. In the spring of 1935 they made
the acquaintance of Miss Esther Dockham, who for about
five years had been teaching in the denominational schools
of the church. At first they saw her only very occasionally,
but as the acquaintance gradually ripened into an intimate
friendship they visited with her about once a month, corresponded with her when she was away, and after a year
or so started calling at her home sometimes as often as once
a week. She called Albertson "Unc" and the wife "Eva,"
and spent much of the visiting time studying and writing
with Albertson on religious topics.
In September, 1938, Miss Dockham accepted a contract
to teach at the Exposition Park School in Los Angeles, and
started to room with the Albertsons in San Pedro, sharing
their living expenses. The Albertsons occupied a tent-house
and she slept in their trailer. During the next year she con·
tinued to teach at the same school but .lived in Los Angeles.
However, she visited the Albertsons from time to time. In
September, 1940, she commenced to teach at the East Los
Angeles School, and met John Kmetz, the murder victim,
soon afterward. He was a deacon of the Seventh Day. Adventist Church and was also a member of the board having
charge of the school where she taught. She saw him from
time to time at meetings of the school board and was also
a visitor at his home. Twenty years her senior, he was
fifty-two years of age and was a widower, having two children, a boy and girl in their teens, with whom he resided
in a small house at 4549 East Third Street, near the East
Los Angeles School. He had regular and permanent em·
ployment as a landscape gardener.
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In January, 1941, Miss Dockham and Kmetz started
"keeping company." For several months she saw him frequently, and almost weekly went with him and the children
on an automobile trip, usually to visit her mother in North
Hollywood. She tol<1 Mr. and Mrs. Albertson that Kmetz
had proposed to her, and on one occasion when she and the
Albertsons attended the East Los Angeles Church and Kmetz
took up the collection she po;nted him out to them as the
man who wanted to marry her. But in March or April she
composed a proposGd letter to him stating:
"Dear Bro. Kmetz. I intended to write you the first of
the week but have been busy cleaning house and getting
material ready for the 8th gr review. I have been thinking
it over, & have decided not to go on the trip during your
vacation. You said you wouldn't go unless I did. I know
the children will be disappointed but I've made up my mind &
I'm not changing it, so don't come & talk with me about it.
If you really love your youngsters you will take them on a
trip and all of you have a good time. If you would go somewhere and give them a good time, you would be happier
yourself. Personally I care nothing for you. I never have,
and I never can. It isn't your fault anymore thHI1 it is mine.
You know everything was to be on a friends hi p basis. I've
tried to act as if I enjoyed what you did for me and I've
felt like a hypocrite for accepting things from you. I appreciate what you have done, but please, I don't want to continue our friendship· as we have. I'd rather it would be
as it was when school first started. You say that there is
probably some reason for all this. Yes, there is, and I'm
telling you straight to your face instead of behind your back.
As I said before, I appreciate all you've done for me but I
don't care anything about ·you and I do not find pleasure
anymore in being with you, in fact I dOl'! 't enjoy being with
you. It's been almost like a punishment for me the last few
times I've been with you and the family. It all started with
the Sunday we went to the mts. I didn't want to go, but
forced myself to, because I said I would go, but I just don't
want to put myself through it anymore. Guess I'm selfish.
When you don't like a person, or I should say, when you
don't care for a person, and it is anything but a pleasure
to be with them, then why go with them? I just can't make
myself go on a trip with you when I feel that I don't care
about you. I can't explain the feeling I have when I'm with
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you but it makes me dislike you instead of liking you. You
hav~ done nothing to make me feel this way so don't blame
yourself. I'd rather you didn't send me anymore candy
or ask me to go anywhere with you and the youngsters. I'd
rather you wouldn't come and talk to me about it, either;
and I'd rather you wouldn't tell the children. 1 don't want·
to discuss it with you or Lola, or anyone. . .. Now don't
sulk and get blue & discouraged. Just go on as you did. be~
fore you knew me. Take the children & have a good tIme.
You have gotten along without a woman for 5 yrs.& I guess
you'll have to get along for a while longer unless you ~an
find someone else. Please don't think I'm angry and t1'ymg
to hurt your feelings. I'm not. I'm trying to tell you ~n as
nice a way as 1 can, that I don't want to go on the trIp or
anywhere else with you. You've been ki~d, almost too kind,
but I haven't appreciated it the way a smgle woman should;
1 guess. 1 told you from the 1st that 1 was affectionate, but
somehow or other I never felt that way toward the men, a~d
1 don't feel the least bit affectionate toward you. 1 WIsh
when you see me ... that you would ignore me. Several have
said from time to time that no matter where 1 sit in church,
a meeting, or a party, that you spe.nt most of you:: time looking & smiling at me. To a certam extent that IS true & .1
don't like it. I don't know why it should bother me, but It
does. Please understand this note, & forget me. I'm just another woman who doesn't appreciate a man's attentions. Respectfully yours,Esther D . " .
.
After writing this intended letter MISS Dockham felt It
was too harsh and composed a second one, stating substantially the same thing in softer language, an? mailed it. to
Kmetz. While searching the Albertson traIler the pohce
found the quoted letter in a drawer. The Albertsons had
previously encouraged Miss Dockham to marry, and she stated.
that if she liad showed them the letter Albertson would have
scolded her.
School closed the latter part of May, and during the first
week of June Albertson called for Miss Dockham at her
home in Los Angeles and drove her to the Albertsons' home
in San Pedro. This was in response to an invitation which
had previouslS been extended by both Mr. and Mrs. Albertson. Albertson was out of work and was attending a welding. school at Redondo Beach. In August, just ahout the
time she was ending her visit with the Albertsons and re-
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turning to her home in Los Angeles, she saw Kmetz to talk
to him for the first time since writing him the letter rejecting his advances. The conversation took place while she and
the Albertsons were attending a church camp meeting at
Lynwood. A few days later, when back in Los Angeles
staying with her brother, she saw Kmetz at his home, and
later, while driving with him, discussed marriage. She explained that her harsh attitude arose out of her belief that
he did not really love her but wanted to marry her so he
would have a good housekeeper, and that she wrote the letter as a test of his feeling. He renewed his proposal and
she promised to marry him. She immediately advised the
.Albertsons by a postal card dated August 14th, reading as
follows:
"Dear Maw and Paw-Prepare for a shock-Mr. Kmetz
and I are to be married Monday night I I expect to be down
Sun. so I can get most of my things. Eva, would you enjoy
fixing my hair for the occasion Y Of course I want you both
& Charlene to come to the wedding. Only a choice few are
invited. I will tell you more about it Sunday. He doem't
want me to teach, but if the board can't get a teacher on such
short notice then of course I feel it my duty to teach until
they can get some one. Love until Sun. morn. Esther. Just
he and I will come. Will have dinner with you. Will bring
ice cream."
On Sunday the two went to the Albertsons as planned,
and Kmetz and Albertson were introduced. So far as known
they had never before met formally. The arrangements for
the marriage ceremony were discussed and Albertson accepted
an invitation to give the bride away. He reminded Miss
Dockham that Kmetz was twenty years her senior and had
two children, but advised her, if she loved him, to go ahead
and marry. The wedding took place according to plan between 8 :00 and 8 :30 of the evening of August 18th at the
home of Dr. and Mrs. Groton, of Norwalk, who were related
by marriage to Kmetz. Miss Dockham's mother, who had
agreed to come if she could, was unable to attend, but her
brother was there, also the Albertsons, the minister and his
wife, and a girl hired to serve refreshments. Mr. Albertson
gave the bride away.
Subsequent to the marriage the Albertsons and the
Kmetzes continued their friendship and visited with each
other on an average of about once a week. Mr. Kmetz and
Mr. Albertson seemed to be friendly. Mrs. Kmetz testified
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that at the time of the marriage she was in love with K~letz,
and was not then and had never before, nor had she smce,
been in love with any other man. With reference to the
statement in the letter which she wrote Kmetz prior to the
marriage, "Now don't sulk and get blue.& dis.coura~ed," she
testified that Mr. Kmetz was in the habIt of llldulgmg these
moods and quite frequently both before and after their marriage he had spells of melancholia and depression, probably
more than a dozen times after the marriage. He told ~er
that they were caused by the way his son acted toward hIm,
that "he acted so disrespectful and so ugly and hateful, and
swore at him and treated him in such a way that he felt
the boy had no love in his heart for him at all." After the
marriage Mrs. Kmetz witnessed occasions when the boy, Raymond then seventeen abused and swore at his father.
In ~ar1y October, about six weeks after the m~rriage, Mrs.
Albertson wrote Mrs. Kmetz, inviting her to ViSIt them over
the week end of October 10th. As a reason for the invitation
she stated that they expected to move away soon, and it might
be the last chance Mrs. Kmetz would have to be with them a~d
to pack up and take back the belongings whi~h she had left III
their home. On October 8th Mrs. Kmetz maIled a postal card
of acceptance, which read: "Dear Folks-I can .come for the
week end. I will be ready when Unc comes FrIday. I suppose some of your news includes Dorothy a:r;td her baby. I
hope she is satisfied now that she has a chIld of her own.
'Well I wanna know!' See you Friday. Love, Esther.".
Although Mr. Kmetz was blue and depressed on FrIday
morning, October 10th, after Mrs. Kmetz told him she w~s
going to the Albertsons for the week end, she ma?e the trIp
with his full and complete consent. He and the childre~ were
home when Mr. Albertson called for her ab~ut 5 :30 III the
afternoon, and she left with Albertson immedIately. On Saturday October 11th she and the Albertsons attended church
at In~lewood. On' Sunday, October 12th, she packed her
things and' in the evening the Albertsons drove her homp..
They arrived about seven o'clock ~nd Mr. Kmetz was not
there' but he came in about five mIllutes later.. He w~ no
longe~ blue and depressed but had an appearance of satIsfa~
tion pleasure, and happiness. Mr. and Mrs. Albertson sta.ye
for twenty or twenty-five minutes and then left. '
.
During the absence of Mrs. Kmetz, on Saturday the. 11th,
Mr. Kmetz and the two childrt>u had a1;tended church III tb.e
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morning, returning home about one in the afternoon. When
they got up to the door the boy picked up a small package
and some letters which the mailman had delivered during
their absence, and handed them to his sister, who in turn
handed them to Mr. Kmetz. The package purported to come
from the "Herb Specialty Co., 1436 N. Wilcox Ave., Hollywood," and bore a Hollywood post office cancellation stamp
dated October 10th, 3 :30 p. m. Later investigation showed
that the company named was unknown at the given address,
which was a building unoccupied between October 1st and
15th. One of the letters likewise purported to come from the
same nonexistent company, but with an address given as "P.O.
Box 231 Hollywood, CaL," and it was postmarked at Los
Angeles, October 10, 5 :00 p. m. The subscriber to this box
number was Bireley's, Incorporated, a beverage concern.
Upon taking the letter and package from his daughter, Mr.
Kmetz set them on the chest of drawers in the front bedroom
leading to the kitchen, which was the bedroom occupied by
him and Mrs. Kmetz. Later on, while the father and daughter
were having their midday dinner, the son having gone out of
the house, Mr. Kmetz opened the package and found that it
contained twelve capsules, although there were compartments
for fifteen. Two of the capsules were dark and the other ten
light. The box was about three inches long and two inches
wide, with a white top alid bottom and orange sides. The
capsules were held in place by holes or compartments punched
in two cardboard trays, and a layer of cotton on top. In addition to the capsules the box contained a letterhead bearing
the name of "The Herb Specialty Co.-Nature's Vitamins
extracted from plant life,' and the typewritten statement:
"Follow Directions Closely 2 Dark Capsules at bedtime. 1
Light Capsule before breakfast Daily."
The letter was also written on the same printed letterhead
of "The Herb Specialty Co. P. O. Box 231 Hollywood, Calif.,"
was dated September 24, 1941, and was signed "The Herb
Specialty Company. Dr. W. W. Mackelroy, Mgr." The
signature "Dr. W. W. Mackelroy" was written in ink but
looked as though it might have been traced, and the penmanship was no better than that of a child. The letter itself was
well worded and contained two pages, single spaced, of advertising data. After the salutation "Dear Friend" it stated:
"We are selecting a limited number of men in variollS localities in and about Los Angeles who have reached the age of
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forty or more whom we believe, without any hesitancy, need
healthful help. This help is coming to you absolutely free of
charge through the use of 'vitalizing. vitamin vigor.' Please
read this entire letter and then let these vitalizing vitamins
put spring in your step." Seven paragraphs followed, ext.olling the virtues of vitamins and promising that I. The story
of how this marvelous discovery was obtained from one of the
oldest Indian tribes in South America by one of the world"s
most famous doctors" would be mailed about October 15th.;
"Here is our plan," the letter concluded, "We are sending
you, under separate cover, a ten days supply of
'vitalizing vitamin vigor' at no cost to you. Follow the simple ,direc--:
tions carefully and when this supply is exhaus~d, 1f you are"
satisfied with the amazing results, send us ten names of men.
that you believe would be benefited by the use of ~vitalizing
vitamin vigor' and for your trouble and benefit we will send;
you free of charge a 30 days supply. We believe this way is
the best and cheapest advertising and a splendid method of;
helping each other including the other fellow. '. . . P. S. We
will also have a fine product of blended herbs for women entering or going through the change of life, when our new labora~'
tory opens on or about October 20th."
'.
After looking at the letter and the box of capsules, while,
sitting at the dinner table. Mr. Kmetz again set them on the
chest of drawers in the bedroom. His daughter noticed, as
she passed through the house, that they remained there. all
day. She testified to a conversation which she had with her
brother about his having examined them during the day. That
evening the brother went out to a party and she went to the
boulevard with her father. Her brother came in at two o'clock
in the morning. She fixed the time because his quarreling
with the father woke her up. She said her father "socked"
her brother, and that: "It waR over Mother. Q. And by
Mother you mean Mrs. Esther Kmetz? A. Yes. Q. And
what was said ~ A. Oh, about, on the order that he hadn't been
acting right, and that he didn't do what she said, and he
should be more obedient. It was on that order. Q. And
what did Ray say just before your father slapped him or
socked him as you recall it? A. I don't remember. Q. Have
you told us all you know about that quarrel now, Lola'
A. Yes."
The capsules also remained on the chest of drawers all of
the following day, October 12th, and were there when the'

our
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Albertsons brought Mrs. Kmetz home about seveu 0 'clock in
the evening. The arrival of the package and letter was not
discussed with them; but the daughter testified that she picked
them up from the chest of drawers and "showed them to
Mother and Mrs. Albertson," and she testified, "Maybe I said
See what Daddy has got for his birthday. I don't remember." The birthday was to occur on October 18th. At the
time of the conversation just referred to, Mr. Albertson was
engaged in bringing in Mrs. Kmetz' things from the automobile.
Mrs. Kmetz took the package and letter and looked at them
and set them back on the chest of drawers. In about five min:
utes Mr. Kmetz arrived and the subject was not mentioned
again until after the Albertsons left. Mrs. Kmetz testified:
' , Well, after the Albertsons left my husband put his car up
and I was out there with him while he did it. We went back
into the house; Raymond was working with something atin the room that he occupied; Lola had finished her ironing
and said she did not feel very good and wanted to know if I
minded if she went to bed instead of sitting up for the evening worship with us, and I told her perhaps she had better
go to bed. Before she went my husband asked if I had seen the
letter that came through the mail with the medicine and I
told him I did not know if he had received any mail with it."
Mr. Kmetz then told his wife about the letter. She sat on
the edge of the bed and read it aloud to him, and then laid it
back on the chest of drawers. The letter, she testified, did not
at that time bear the Mackelroy signature looking as it later
appeared, nor the word "Dr." preceding the name. At the
time of trial the signature looked to her as though it had been
traced over one which was originally written by a better pen.
man.
After the letter was read, both spouses continued with their
preparations for bed, meanwhile discussing the events of the
week end. After Mr. Kmetz had put on his pajamas and
emerged from the bathroom, the two had evening worship.
Then they sat on the bed and talked for a while. He stepped
in the bathroom again and then asked Mrs. Kmetz if she
thought he should take the medicine. She said: "Oh, I told
him from what we had read in the letter, that it assured us
that it could not do any possible harm, so I guessed if he took
them it certainly could not harm him in any way." Again,
she said: "Well, I thought it was some kind of spring tonic,
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and I guess he did too, because we discussed it. fr0t?- that
standpoint. He was unusually well and st:ong for hIS age,
and we .wondered why anybody would thmk. he needed a
t onIC.
· . . . Well , I told him from what we
. read
h m the
' letterI
ess
I said 'It certainly couldn't do a person any arm, so gu.
it wouldn't hurt him maybe if he took them." She ~ad p,reVld
ously read the directions" 2 Dark Capsules at be?t1me, an
had noted that two of the capsules were darker m color and
larger than the others.
Mr Kmetz thereupon picked up the box of capsules and
went' into the kitchen. He called back· asking how to take
capsu1es. Mrs . Kmetz told him to swallow them and
d take
h a
drink of water afterwards, and she heard. a s9Ull snc as
would be made by drawing water and ~~~cmg a g~ass ~n t~;
. k Mr Kmetz immediately said that It made hIm dIZZY.
~~ ~ame 'into the bedroom, put the window up, fell back. on
the bed, let out a "horrible groan" and started bre~thm.g
very heavily and noisily and frothing at th? mouth,. WIth hIS
eyes seeming to bulge. Mrs. Kmetz .wiped hIS face WIth a ~e~
rag and tried to administer other aId. In about fifteen mm
utes shortly after 9 :15 o'clock, she called Dr. Vern?n Ingle,
who' pumped out the contents of the stoma~h. A? mhalator
squad then arrived, but artificial respiratIon faIled and at
10 ·35 p. m., Mr. Kmetz was pronounced dead.
.
radio patrol officer, Edward M. Crum, took the radIO call
for the inhalator squad and arrived at the house about the
same time as the squad. Two neighbors, M:r. and Mrs. Mc·
Gill were in the living room. Mr. Crum testIfied that as long
as he was in the house "Mrs. Kmetz was very calm and very
collected. She was even more or less joking wi~h Mr. and
Mrs McGill. She treated the whole matter very hg~tly. S~e
h . d no emotion at all. I paid particular attentIon to It,
~e~::se I thought that it was rather strange.", Mr. Crum ~as
there nntil after midnight, when the coroner s representatIve
. d . Mrs . Kmetz showed him the letter, box
capsules
h he
arrIve
b of h'
and directions, and also the wrapper on the ox ':' IC ~
cxtracted from the trash can. Dr. I~gle ~lso testIfie~t .at
Mrs. Kmetz was "very calm and. cool whl!e ~e was ~ ~m.
. termg
'
to her husband and inqUIred,
IS
. as dartIfiCIal
to" respIratIon
t
'ed
"Do
you
think
he
IS
dea
ye,
. d d l\{r
·
b
was emg rl ,
After Dr. Ingle had pron~unc.ed Mr. Kmetz ea
.:
Crum started to make an investIgatIon and to gather w~at e~
dence he could. He talked with Mrs. Kmetz and durmg t e
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course of the conversation got the Mackelroy letter from her.
He folded the letter and laid it under his uniform cap on top
of the piano. A short time later he found the letter in Mrs.
Kmetz' possession again, at which time she returned it to him
at his request, and he then put it in his pocket. The envelope
in which the letter arrived was retrieved from the McGills,
who for some reason had carried it home.
The autopsy report was that Mr. Kmetz died from cyanide
poisoning, and the lack of corrosion in the oral cavity of his
throat indicated that it had been swallowed rapidly in some
vehicle with a protective covering like a capsule. This poison
gives off an odor of bitter almonds, which was noticed by both
Dr. Ingle and Mrs. Kmetz while they were administering aid.
"Cyanogas" is used in agricultural work, mining, and pest
control, and is procurable at any drug store, feed and seed,
or hardware store in the United States. No prescription or
signing of the poison register is required in making the purchase. In color the poison is dark gray, and it is composed
of small particles-a material of about the same color and
form as the contents of the two dark capsules. About half
the amount contained in one of the capsules would be sufficient to kill an average 150-pound man in about thirty
minutes.
On Monday, October 13th, the day after the death, Mrs.
Kmetz went to school in the morning but returned home in the
afternoon, and then went to the Albertsons in the evening.
They were not home when she arrived, but came in after she
had retired. She told them about the death of Mr. Kmetz,
and they appeared to be sorry and upset, as any friends would
be on hearing bad news. Mr. Albertson seemed to be as much
upset as Mrs. Albertson, and promised that they would both
"stick by" and help out until everything was taken care of.
The following day the Albertsons returned home with Mrs.
Kmetz and lived there with her until Mr. Albertson was arrested and charged with the murder. Mrs. Albertson continued on, and was still living there with Mrs. Kmetz several
months later when the cause was first called for trial.
. On the first trial Mrs. Kmetz testified as a witness for the
People, and Mr. Albertson took the witness stand in his own
behalf. The jury disagreed, and six weeks later the cause
came on for retrial. Mrs. Kmetz could not then be found,
although diligent search was made. However, the testimony
which she had given un the first trial was read to the jury.
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witness stand but stood on, his
Mr. Albertson did not tak.e the
lffered nO evidence at all
plea of not guilty, and hIS counse 0
in his behalf.
.
neet Mr. Albertson with the
The evidence purportmg to con I circumstantial, and con,
crime as already stated, w~s pnre y
.
'
. I f the followmg:
22
slsted mam y. 0
M' testified that on September, .
A printer In Santa .0D1~ and placed an ordt>r for 1000
1941 a man called at hIS s op . 1t Company "and pursulette~heads for "The Her: Sle::reyprinted, o;e of which the
an! to th~ ord~r the le~~: l:~terhead received by Mr. Kme~.
prmter ldentlfied. a s .
h and the cnstomercall,~d for It
The work was paId for m ?as '. d about multigraphmg and
on September 24th. .He mi~~r~etter Shop in SantaMo,?,ica.
the printer referred hIm to
Albertson the prmter
.
'd ffy the customer as
"f
In refusmg to 1 en 1" Q But at this time you can not Identl y
testified as follows:
.
h
as the man who made that
Mr. Albertson, the defendant eret, He resembles a person I
, A No I can no .
,"
Q M
order, can you
.
,
I would not say where.. . 1:.
have seen somewhere, but
th the man, you have deAlbertson is a much larger m;n ~d ay that he is a little
wou s
",
Scribed is he not 7 A. Well,
lighter in weIght.
Th Letter Shop testified that on SepA stenographer at
e
r o'clock she typed the
tember 24th betwe~n three;:~~~z (Ex. 15)., She did the
two-page letter recelVed by
. . d
to whether she saw
d "A
d when questlone as,
typing for a man, an
h
mbled him, she state, , .
that man in court, or one w 01res~ Q And where is the man
One who resembl~s him verio:e~se ihe ~an for whom you did
that resembles hIm veryc nda~t Mr. Albertson." About ,a
that typing? A. The defe
the man returned and ordered,
raphed copies of a one-page
W eek after she typed the lette:,
500 m l m e o g . · '
on the same letterh ead ,
dvertising "vitalizing .V1tanun
letter, dated Oct~ber 3, 1941, !enerous supply absolutely free
vigor " and offermg to send a t:>
lIed to the funeral of Mr.
, days " trIa.
1 When she was ca there she could 1'den t'£y
for ten
1
Kmetz and asked if there was anYtonethe office she "thought"
' . .
as the pOSSl'ble person that camel' fi0 d "I wasn't
positive. . . .
she identified him there, but tes \:er of having seen the man
was oue ra 'ly l'n the Letter ShoP." At
The impression I hadt not
necessarl
.
. ed
somewhere before, b u
typed the customer lnqulr
the time the two-page letter ~as the stenographer asked him
about mimeographing and ; e~, he said not at the time, that
if he wished to place au or er
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he wanted to show this letter I was typing to some olie, and
that he would take it out of the office, and would bring back
a copy to be mimeographed. And there was not much other
conversation. " After the death of Mr. Kmetz, and on the
Monday before the inquest, the stenographer saw a man walk
through the Arcade who looked "vaguely familiar." She
walked to the door to look at him again, and he turned back
into the street. She had a "strange premonition" that he
was going to return, and look in again. He did so, and had
part of his face covered with his hand over his eye; "He
peered in and walked on." Although she had thus had more
than one occasion to consider the identity of the customer,
she could not identify him positively at the inquest as Albertson, but stated: "Not positively, but they resemble each
other."
.Mrs. Harris, the proprietor of The Letter Shop, also talked
WIth the customer eoncerning the order for mimeographing
the 500 letters. He left the order on October 2nd, wanted the
work rushed, and called for it On October 3rd. In the courtroom Mrs. Harris identified the customer as Albertson. She
was asked: "Q. I will ask you if you will look around the
courtroom and see whether or not you can identify here any
person that is the person you saw in your shop on October
2nd and October 3rd, who placed the order for the mimeographed sheets? A. Yes, Mr. Albertson. Q. Do you recognize him as the man who placed the order? A. Yes. Q. And
the man who received delivery? A. Yes." On cross-examina_
tion it was brought out that Mrs. Harris had attended the
funeral of Mr. Kmetz, but was not then so sure of her identification. She was asked: "Q. And at the funeral did you see
any person whom you recognized as the same person who
had been in your office and transacted the business and received the mimeograph from you on October 2nd and October
the 3rd Y A. Yes, I saw this person, but I wanted to be more
sure and wanted to see him again without his glasses and to
hear him talk. Q. In other words, when you saw him at the
funeral he was wearing glasses? A. Yes. Q. And when you
saw him at the inquest he was not? A. Yes. Q. And was he
wearing glasses when he was in your office on October 2nd and
October the 3rd Y A. No." It also appeared on cross-examination that Mr. Albertson's appearance did not tally in all
respects with the desc:ription Mrs. Harris had originally given
of her customer.

Jan. 1944]

565

PEOPLE 'V. ALBli:RTSON
[23 C.2d 550)

Mrs. Souther, a public stenographer in Hollywood, tes~ified.
that on the morning of October 9, 1941, a man whom she Identified in the courtroom as Albertson appeared at her office and
gave her a penciled list of names and an order t~ address
twenty-one envelopes. He waited for them and paId her 45
cents. During the fifteen minutes he was in her ?ffice he was
observed by another customer. This custo~e: test~:6.ed ~hat the
man in the office resembled Albertson. HIS Identification was
not positive. He stated: "I can't tell you I am absolutely
sure, because truly I am not absolutely sure. I ha~e a stron~
impression and I had the impression that I saw hIm th.ere.
Mrs. Souther remembered the name '~K~etz" on the hst of
names given her because of its peculIarIty and als~ b~cause
th
b tone" K" on the list. Typewriter tests mdlcated
ere was u
h
ddressed
that the envelope received by Kmetz was t e one a

sign~r

by::rtrace of any "W. W. Mackelroy," the
of the
1 tter could be found. A handwriting expert testI~ed that
e
,characteristics and features 0 f t h'IS d'ISpUt ed .SIgnature .
"the
compare WI'th the admitted handwritings of Albertson
. bl
t to
. tya
degree that would indicate to me the reasona . e cer ~m
that the Albertson handwritings and the questIOned SIg~a
ture were both written by the same person," and anot er
"
expert gave similar testimony.
On one occasion while Mrs. Kmetz was staying WIth. the
Albertsons in the summer of 1941, prior to .her. marrIage,
she asked Mr. Albertson to buy her some Vlt~mIn A caples at the drug store. He purchased and delIvered to her
:u box of Pro-Vite capsules, which she took, and wh~n her
over she left the box in the Albertson traIler or
. 't
VISI was
"'1
'f
about the premises. This box, she ~estI:6.ed, was SImI ar, 1
ot identical with a Pro-Vite capsule box. (Peo. Ex. 11)
~hich was p;ocured by prosecuting officers from the S~n~ag
drug store, and contained two pasteboard trays contammg
perforations or holes for forty round, black capsules and
forty round orange capsules.
The box c~ntaining the poison capsules bore no resembl.ance
whatsoever to the box purchased at the drug store, eIther
in size, shape, or appearance, except that the drug store b~x
was entirely covered with orange-colored paper, w~~reas ~h e
other box had a strip of orange paper around ~e SI es. d e
latter seemed obviously to be a homemade affaIr. The rug
store box had trays accommodating eighty capsules, the home-
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made box a tray accommodating fifteen. One of the handwriting experts, however, testified that the holes in the trays,
of both boxes were of the same size and were the same unequal distances apart, and he undertook to demonstrate to
the jury that the tray from the homemade box matched one
area of the tray from the drug store box. An analysis of
tiny particles of paste taken from the homemade box was
also said to show the same chemical content as that of a bottle of mucilage, of five and ten-cent store variety, found by
officers in the Albertson trailer on October 22nd. Traces of
orange color were also said to have been found on the rubber
squeegee of the mucilage bottle.
The capsules themselves were entirely different. Those in
the drug store box were in the form of a round manufactured translucent pill, resembling a small glass marble. Those
in the homemade box were made of the familiar purchasable,
colorless, oblong, telescopic capsules. The capsules had been
IDled with small greenish gray and black particles resembling grass seed, or dry grass or herbs chopped up finely.
Mrs. Kmetz testified that her husband had various kinds of
medicine around the house and she had seen capsules for
colds.

iiIi
I;

In considering the sufficiency of this evidence to prove
the gUilt of Albertson, it is pertinent to note the startling
fact that no motive whatsoever is shown. Pure speculation
that there may have been a romantic attachment between
Albertson and Mrs. Kmetz is met by the fact that the evidence without contradiction contains every indication to the
contrary. The long marriage of the Albertsons, the fact that
they both welcometi Mrs. Kmetz to their home, and the close
and intimate friendship existing between the two women,
show a relationship which in reasonable, probability would
not have endured over a period of years before, and con.
tinued after the Kmetz marriage I'lnd murder, had there been
a meretricious attachment between Albertson and Mrs.
Kmetz. Neither is there any evidence from which it could
be intimated or inferred that Mrs. Kmetz was unhappy in
her marriage to a degree which would lead Albertson, out
of loyal friendship, to attempt to put the husband out of the
way. So far as is shown or can be inferred, the family life
of the two couples was harmonious and their continuing
friendship was sincere. Betterment of living conditions
could scarcely have been the motive of Albertson, for the
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Kmetz house was apparently Iibout on' a par with the Albert·
son trailer-tent home.
.
't
be conceded furnishes but
[1] The absence of .motIv~, I may . r in c~nnection with
one elemen~ for conslder~tlO~ by ~:e
if proof of guilt is
the other Clrcu~tances In t e ca th
resumption of innootherwise suffiCIent to oVter:;a~~ co~vfcted notwithstanding
cence the defendant mus
theless .. absence of
. h
b
shown But never
,
.
't'
f innocence" (Peono motIve as een
d t
pport the presump Ion 0
d
motive ten s 0 su
I 315 328 [184 P. 389]), or as state
ple v. Tom Woo, 181 C~8 C
387 390-391' [281 P. 609], a
hi People v. Kelley, 2
a. t"
"The absence of proof
I· d
on by the prosecu lon,
,
"
cl9.se re Ie up
k
d on the side of innocence.
of motive is a fact to be .rec one' f 't be admitted as a premAnother striking f~ct .IS, en 1 a~l the capsules to Kmetz
ise that Albertson dId m act mvidence whatsoever that he '
there is a complete !ack of anYd ethe poison, or placed poison
purchased or o~herwI~~ p~~~u:~ capsules was delivered at the
in two of the pIlls.
e
midday on Saturday; October
Kmetz home and openedh at h t of drawers in the bedroom,
11th. It wa~ place~ on ~ ~uc ~Sthe house, and there it stayed
a room used m passmg t r g
11 da Sunday and
throughout the rem~inde; o~ Satu:~~~iO:k w~n Mrs. Kmetz
Sunday evening until at eas se;~e ca sul~s were of the telereturned with t~e Albertsons. t' d a~d refilled by anyone.
scopic type WhICh bcan b~ ~~t sI:aled ampoule variety they
Had the capsules e~n 0 b 'ect to tampering, but they were
could not have been t us S? J nd the poison used was one
of the home-prepared varIety, a
b of stores No tes.
'1
able at any num er
.
f
which is easl y procur dd ced to show that the contents (j
timony whatsoever was a u
tam ered with during the
the capsules were not chan~ed t': Kr!tz home' or that the
period the box stood ~pent I~he ~ailing of the 'package.
,
poison was inserted p~lOr 0
a sules with intent to mur~
If Alberts?n had p~lsonet t~le ctl~t he would have left so
der Kmetz, It seems ~mp:;h a e:pect to his activities in prowide and open a. t~all :~teri:l After completing the prepcuring the advertIsmg
,
. h' h was mailed to Kmetz,
.
f th to-page letter w IC
.
f th
aratIon 0
e w ..
m ai
designed to brmg or
initiating an advertISI~g caap~ul:npurchasers, there was no
the names of prospec lve Cd rrange for the mimeographing
reason for, him to return an ad rtisement or to go to still
00
. of a shorter a ve
,
t ed
of 5
COPI~
another
publIc place 0 f bUsiness to have envelopes yp ,
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thus opening the way for his multiple identification in case
of detection. On the other hand, if· these activities were carried out by someone "resembling" Albertson with deliberate
intent to kill Kmetz and cast suspicion o~ Albertson the
transaction~ could not have been more cunningly arra~ged
to accomplIsh the foul purpose. If Albertson did in fact
prepare and mail the capsules, but unknown to him two of
them were poisoned by another, this would logically explain
the openness with which he conducted his early activities
and a later attempt to conceal and deny them. The evidence
indicates convincingly that Albertson himself did not have
the educational qualifications which would make him capable
of composing the advertising material.
On motion for new trial, Albertson in protesting his innocence, informed the trial court that he had wished to take
the stand in his Own behalf, as at the first trial, and that
he fe!t he could have put on a defense which was beyond
questIOn.
[2] To strengthen its case, and over vigorous protests of
Albertson's counsel, the prosecution offered and was permitted to introduce hundreds of pages of testimony relating
to strange happenings on the night of AUQUst 30 1941. If
the admission of this evidence was erroneo"'us, the' error was
clearly prejudicial because of the overwhelminO' volume of
such testimony, comprising a major portion of the transcript
on appeal, and also because of the doubtful and circumstantial nature o~ the evidence as a whole. (People v. Dail, supra;
People v. S1lver, supra.) This evidence was admitted for
consideration by the jury, as limited by the court's instruction as follows: "You are further instructed that the defendant is not on trial in this case for any crime connected with
an assault upon John Kmetz on or about the 30th of AuO'ust
1941. The evidence with regard to the transactions of AuOgus~
30th, 1941 are to be considered by you only as the same may
relate to the matter of the relationship of the defendant to
.John Kmetz, the matter of premeditation, the matter of malIce or the matter of motive. Such evidence may not be considered by y?u for any other purpose." On appeal, however,
the prosecutIOn took the position that: "It is our contention
that the evidence relating to the assault of August 30 1941
was admissible here under the rule of common sch~me
plan, which in turn tended to connect appellant with the
commission of the crime charged in the indictment. • •• The
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jury was entitled from the evidence to conclude th~t each
plan was conceived by a mind disposed toward deceptIOn and
secrecy." (Resp. Br. 114.)
This voluminous evidence of the strange occurrences of
August 30th shows the following: On Saturday, August 30,
1941 twelve days after the Kmetz marriage, Mr. and Mrs.
Km~tz and the daughter went to visit the mother of Mrs.
Kmetz in North Hollywood. They arrived home at 10 :20 in
the evening. The time is fixed definitely because they found
on their return that the son had left a note in the door saying he had gone down on the boulevard with a boy friend
and would be home by 11 0 'clock. This note caused Mrs.
Kmetz to look at her watch, which read 10 :20. On approaching the house they had seen parked aro.und t~e corner an old
model automobile, which Mrs. Kmetz, III tryIng to report to
the police later described as a car which "looked like the
car my u~cle drove." She refused absolutely to identify it
as Albertson's car. After the Kmetz car pulled up in front
of their garage, which was located near the sid;walk, with
the house in the rear of the lot, Mr. Kmetz carrIed the groceries into the house and Mrs. Kmetz and the daughter entered with him. In a few minutes Mr. Kmetz went out to
put the car away. Mrs. Kmetz and the daughter heard a
noise or muffled cry. They rushed out to the front porch
and the daughter heard her father cry, "Stop, thief, "or
some words like that. They saw Mr. Kmetz in the vacant
lot just east of the house. He was very excited, and upon
reentering the house they found that his hat was cut in tw:o
places his head was bruised and cut, but not deeply, and hIS
ear h~d been pulled away from his head. Although there
was light at the intersection and Mr. Kmetz was not knocked
out by the first blow but was able to grapple with hi~ ass~il
ant and ward off subsequent blows, he ~~uld no~ Ide~tIfy
the assailant. If the assailant was the famlhar ~amlly fr~en~,
Albertson it seems he should have been recognIzed. Wlthlll
a few mi~utes after the assault, the lights went on and off
on the car parked around the corner and it moved away.
The following morning Mr. Kmetz show:ed Mrs .. Kmetz a
bent pickax handle which he said he had pIcked up III the lot.
Shortly before, or at approximately the ti?Ie of. the assault,
that is, at approximately 10 :15 p. m., radIO polIceman ~el
logg saw an automobile driven b~ a man ru~ at fort~-five mlles
an hour through a traffic stop SIgn at an llltersectlOn located
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about four blocks from the K t
~"- - - after proceeding for more th me z ~~me. He gave chase and
doned and empty exce t tha:r: a mI e. he found the car aban.
personal effects Th· P
It contamed clothing and other
·
sh owed that the. car 18 was at.10
.·22 p. m. I
nvestIgation
Albertson and that th was regIstered in the name of Mrs
out on th~ back seat ~:r::tsona\ e~~cts, clothing neatly laid
cles and a postal card (E 3~on ammg a?out $2.00, spectabelonged to Albertson ";her' later herem described), etc.,
chased by the officer ~a th e was no proof that the car
Kmetz. There is also a :ime edf ar used by th~ assailant of
was committed between 10 .20 sc~epancy, for If the assault
by ~he Kmetz family, the as~aila~~ co1~~25 p. m.! as testified
perIod have been driving his c
u not .durIng the same
Kmetz home, and the car coul ar at some dIstan.ce from the
the officer at 10 :22.
d not have been pIcked up by
Between midnight of t h ·
.
.e samfe evemng, August 30th and
1:00 o'clock of the
Allum and Cox in mornIng 0 August 31st, police officers
,response to a telepho
11
to Garnet and Soto Streets
d.
ne ca , proceeded
l' a Istance of about three and
one-tenth miles from th
the abandoned car. The p ~~ where officer Kellogg' found
half reclining position o:r:h ey :aw Albertson lying in a
hands. He was clad onl in ~iPar way ~ith his head on his
and was suffering from ~e' ol~ undershIrt, shorts and socks,
police station and gave him :om~ c~~~ took him back to the
of hot water. After a short
mg and a glass Or two
story, which was that he too r~s~ he was able to tell them his
appears to have been ~orse'
undergone an ordeal which
an that of Kmetz. His tale
seemed incredible to the offi
it, but had him dictate a f~~r:, and .they refused to believe
A!bertson's story was as fo~fo~WI:Itt~n report (Ex. 102).
receIved in the mail a ostal
s.
n August 29th he
lows: "Dear AI-Ho p ld card. (Ex. 30) reading as fola friend of mine abou~ ;~; .rou hke to be a villiage smithy
a smith and asked me to try ~~~sfi:o;th of L?s Angeles need~
will be here Sat. night or Sun
e one ~h18 week end. He
Sat. night 8 p. m. at cor Ver~:or~. If Interested meet me
counter. I have spare r~om com t efferson ~wl drug cigar
and see him. Friendly yo
G e stay all mght to be sure
.
.
urs, eorge Crocker" Th·
wrItten In pencil all but th .
..
18 was
Alb
'
e SIgnature bemg .
..
. ertson discussed the invitation with h. In. prIntIng.
deCIded that he should kee th
. IS WIfe and they
p
e appomtment because he
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needed a job and had followed the trade of blacksmith.
Albertson asked his wife to accompany him but she declined
because she was not feeling well and did not want to keep
up Charlene (a young girl who was living with them), and
because he told her that more than likely he would be back
that evening. He drove to Jefferson and Vermont Streets,
and at about twenty minutes to 8 :00 0 'clock he parked hiR
car on the south side of Jefferson Street. He waited there
but no one showed up, so he entered the drug store and
inquired of a rather large lady if a Mr. Crocker had been
at the store inquiring for him. Receiving a negative reply
he stated that he had ail. appointment there with Mr. Crocker.
and the lady suggested that he contact the girl who was coming on duty at 8 :00 o'clock and leave word With her for
this Mr. Crocker. He then returned to his car and wrote
the license number of the car and his name on a piece of
cardboard. He went back to the- drug store, inquired of a
different young lady, and left the card. He again returned
to the automobile and in a few minutes a man approached
and asked if he was Mr. Albertson, introducing himself as
Mr. 0 'Connor. He told Albertson that Crocker was unable
to keep the appointment because he had to work at SearsRoebuck until around 9 :00 o'clock, and had sent O'Connor
in his place. The two men sat in the car and conversed on
various subjects, 0 'Connor stating that he was temporarily
out of work, was a gardener by trade and was anxious to
get placed ill that sort of employment. Albertson said he
had a friend of the family who was a gardener for the board
of education, referring to Kmetz, and that. if 0 'Connor
would contact Kmetz he might secure w.ork. He gave O'Connor a card with the name and address of Kmetz on it. This
part of the conversation concerning the giving of the name
of Kmetz was not related to the police at first, but was told
by Albertson at a later date.
.
After some further conversation, and at O'Connor's suggestion, Albertson drove to the vicinity of the Sears-Roebuck
store where 0 'Connor said they would meet Crocker as he
came off duty. When they reached that location O'Connor
told Albertson to pull up, that he saw Crocker waiting.
Albertson stopped the car, O'Connor got out, and there was
another man standing at the curb. This man, whom Albertson had never seen before, said "Hello, AI" and put out his
hand. Albertson shook hands with him. and the man then
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got into the fr?nt seat while 0 'Connor got into the back
:c~. A~he man In the front seat then pulled out a bottle arid
o . . ertson to have a drink. Albertson said he was not a
drInkIng m.an, to which the other replied, "This is one time
you are gOIng to take a d~ink." 0 'Connor, from the back
seat, then pushed somethIng into Albertson's back which
Albertson thought was a gun, the man in the front seat held
the bottle to Albertson's mouth, held his shoulders and
h
'
Albertson drank Afte
h t t'
f
th f f '
r a s or Ime e became unconscious
~om e e ects of the drink. When he came to he was in
~18 underwear, lying in a vacant lot. He wandered about
In the general vicinity until he observed a party in progress
and a couple of Mex~can boys on the sidewalk. He called
~ne of them over to hIm and asked the lad to call the police
~~a~ment. It was pursuant to this call that the police
PIC e Alb.ertson ~p. At the police station he stuck to his
story notWIthstandIng ~he officers' disbelief. His abandoned
car ~abd falready b~en pIcked up by the police in the manner
hereIn
e ore descrIbed.
th So .far as appears, neither Kmetz nor Albertson knew on
e mght of August 30th, Or on Sunday, August 31st, that
~e other had been assaulted. On Monday following Labor
hay, Mr. and Mrs. Kmetz drove in about noontime to visit
t e Alber~sor;s. T~ey noticed that the Albertson car was
gone. ThIS ImmedIately led to a conversation about the
occ~rrences of August 30th and the two men exchanged
storIes. As Kmetz related his assault, Albertson did not ap~ear to ~rs. ~metz to be nervous, but, according to her test~mony, he Just appeared to be somebody who had been
SIck and who had gotten up but was not able to be up " Mr
~metz, after hearing that Albertson had given his ~ssaiIa:t
t e Kmetz name and address, advanced the theory that und~ubtedly the man. took Albertson's car and proceeded to
assault Kmetz. ThIS theory harmonized with the time element so far as Albertson's testimony that he was assault d
about 9 :00 0 'clock and the Kmetz testimony that he w~s
assaulted about 10 :20 are concerned, but would not explain
how. the officer could have been chasing the Albertson automobIle at the same time, unless Mrs. Kmetz misread the time
on her watch, or the watch was a little fast. If Albertson
and Kmetz, through
their church work,
hade
mad a common
.
enemy, who ~rIed to murder Kmetz and throw suspicion on
Albertson, thl8 t~eor! would fully explain the double assaults
and the later pOlsoiling plan.

j

i

Jan. 1944]

PEOPLE

v.

ALBERTSON

[23 C.2d 550]

573

After the Albertsonsand Kmetzes had exchanged stories
of the assaults, they all drove to revisit the scene and to call
at the sheriff's substation. From the latter place they pruceeded to the Kmetz home, where both men were interviewed
officially in the presence of each other. Kmetz fiXed the time
of his assault at 10 :15 p. m., instead of 10 :20, and Albertson became excited and advanced the opinion that it must
have been his car that the assailant escaped in. Kmetz seemed
to agree.
Albertson was told that the police officers had his car and
the personal effects found in it, including the Crocker postal
card, and he stated that he did not know the man who. wrote
the card. The following day he and Mrs. Albertson again
called at the sheriff's office and Albertson was interviewed
alone. He again repeated his story and reiterated that it
was the truth. The officers again refused to credit it, and
one testified: "I told him that it appeared very much to
me that this robbery was the result of some act of perversion, and I wanted to know if that was the truth, and he
said that it was not." At the completion of the interview
Mrs. Albertson was brought in and Albertson said to her:
,. This man believes I am lying; he says I am lying about
this whole thing." The officer then so stated to Mrs. Albertson. Another officer then checked over what Albertson had
said and explained why they did not believe it, and Mrs.
Albertson replied: "Well, he is my husband, he has always
been good to me, I know it sounds awfully funny, but I still
must believe him." The police then refused to have any~
thing more to do with the case and returned to Albertson
his property, including the Crocker postal card (Ex. 30).
Thereafter the friendship of the Kmetzes and the Albertsons was uninterrupted and they continued to exchange visits
on an average of once a week until the time of the murder.
The murder caused the reopening of the police investigation. They advanced the theory that Albertson deliberately
planned to kill Kmetz; that he wrote the Crocker postal to
himself to furnish an excuse for leaving his home on the
evening of August 30th; that he left the message at the drug
store for the purpose of establishing an alibi for himself;
that there were no such persons as Crocker and 0 'Connor;
that he was not drugged or robbed, but in fact proceeded
to the Kmetz home and there concealed himself until the
return of the family j that he assaulted Kmetz with intent
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to kill him, and then faked. th
.'
further protection But th' d e assault on humelf for his
if Albertson, clad only
h~:s no~ gibe with the fact that
Kmetz, Kmetz would hav b
un .erwear, had assaulted
of his assailant's attire w~ileee~aCOg~Izant. of t~e peculiarity
~ave reported it; and if Alber~so~plmg wIth hIm and would
It would have been impossible f
~ad not then been so clad
and effects and pile them neatl or hIm to remove his clothing
seems obvious because the rna: on the seat .o~ the car. This
son. car while the police pursue;~~ w~s drIvm~ the. Albert·
t' t
on y had tIme, m aban·
donmg the car to J'ump
.'
ou m 0 the sh bb
'
The polIce car was within sight 11 th r~ ery and escape.
hand; the theory of a co
a . e tIme. On the other
the facts.
mmon assaIlant is plausible under

i:

. :~;
':

1

I

.1

,
i

1'1

j" . j

When, subsequent to the
d
search the Albertson tent hou mur er, t~e officers wished to
no objection but turned .
Set~ndk traIler, Albertson offered
permitted them to take t: ver e eys to the premises and
were later placed in evid:n sev~rall l~~ters and postals which
(Ex. 30). In an endeavor t:e, ~nc u mg the Crocker postal
Crocker postal to himself th s ~ that Albe.rtson wrote the
exemplars (Ex. 31a and' Ex e 301bcers had hIm prepare two
some respects similar and i' th)' J.h~ exemplars are in
inaI. One exemplar (E 3~b 0 ers ~sImilar to the orig.
) reads hne for line with the
original (Ex 30) th fiX.
'd'
. , erst and last words 0
h l'
,
I entlCaI. Albertson testified th t h'
n eac me bemg
officers told him to mak h'
a t IS occurred because the
as he could Th ffi e IS copy as near like the orirnnal
.
e 0 cers deny th'
d .
b~
tated the postal card messa
IS ~n
state that they die·
able that a dictated note ge'ld But It scar~ely seems believthe original, even if both WO~tal <3ome out ~me for line with
hand The oth
I P s were wrItten by the same
.'
er posta card (Ex 31 )
tlOn bears little resemblanc t th'
~. on casual examina0
e orIginal (E 30)
E VI'd ence was given by ehand
't'
x..
of the theory that Alb ts
wri mg experts in support
30) and the two exemp~:rsO(Ewro~~ the ;r~ginal postal (Ex.
the Mackelroy signature on t~' : an. . x. 31b), and also
~ a. vertIsmg letter. In explaining the basis of this
"Now, I spoke a moment a cone uSlOn,. o.ne. exp~rt testified:
larities. I perhaps could t:~e a~out dISSImIlarItIes and simihaps months, in ointin
ours ?r days or weeks, perhandwriting of M~ Albe gt out the dl~~rences between the
31~~ andbut
Exhibit
31.B, and in the ~ther e:::pl~nrsEoxfhhI~lt
IS wrltmg;
I do
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not [think] that merely pointing out differences wonld avail
me anything in coming to a conclusion. It is really a mat·
ter, in my judgIllent, of evaluating differences. I think the
differences should be noted very carefully, because in any
handwriting, and any identification problem, the differences
should be noted, and sometimes they are really more impor· .
tant than the similarities. But in any event, handwriting
identification is a combination of two things, accurate obser·
vation and correct reasoning applied to what is seen. With·
out the reasoning process applied to those differences of
course I don't think anything could be identified. . . . "
Thereafter, the expert classified "the differences in Exhibit
30" as "explainable differences to those found .in Exhibits
31-A and 3l.B". and stated:" I think that Exhibit 30 was
without questioI). written by the same person who wrote Exhibits 3l·A and 3l·B."
Counsel for Albertson suggests that if it would take the
handwriting expert "honrs or days or weeks, perhaps
months" to point out differences in the handwriting of
Albertson on the several exhibits, "then it is permissible to
inquire of what possible value such testimony could be to a
layman on the jury. The statement seems utterly absurd
and we are unable to follow the processes of reasoning leading up to his conclusion."
Another handwriting expert testified: "Well, it is my
opinion, without any reservation, that the same person wrote
all three of these exhibits. There is an overwhelming individuality in this questioned writing, when you study.all these
.characters and see how they are made, the size of them, the
spacing of them, the slant of the letters, the pen strokes, all
the factors that enter into the considerf!,tionof thishandwriting;" But this witness was also troubled by "differences"
for he said: "I might state that it has been my observa~
tion, from examining this writing that there are more differences between the two specimens of admitted writing [Ex.
3la and Ex. 3lb] than there are between the questioned writing [Ex. 30] and the specimens of admitted handwriting.
... There are probably more differences .between the genuine
writing on these two cards (Ex.. 3la and Ex. 3lb1 than there
is between the questioned writing (Ex. 30], and the writing
on Exhibit 31.B. That doesn't apply to 3l-A."
Is it not obvious that the differences prove, if anything,
that when Albertson prepared similar exemplar 3lb he was,
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~ he testified, .trying to ~bey the admonition of the police
o h cer to make It as near lIke the original postal as he could
~ er~as. ~hen he wrote dissimilar exemplar 3la he was print~
Ing In hIS own form? He testified: "Q. What d'd V
Meter say t
h h
I
an
· 0 you w en e asked you to copy Exhibit 31 B
f
rom E xhlbit 30? A He told
t
I could Q Ad' th
me. 0 cOpy that as near as
far as'
.
n IS at what you dId T A. Yes, sir. Q. As
M V yO~ were able to you made an exact copy of the card
A r an. eter gave you at that time Y A. That is correct"
n agaIn: . ".Q. Now, when you were asked by Van Met~r
to copy ExhIbIt 30, when you made this Exhibit 31-B d' d
he tell you how to
't 0 A"
, I
•
As near like the original
copy I I
: I C~~ld. Q. hDid he tell you to copy the letters and make
em e same s ape, if possible Y A. He said to copy it as
near as I could."
"
~his sta~e of proof directs attention at once to one of the
maIn
questIOns
to wit·
.
'd
' argued on appeal,
. W,,,,
..., th e vo IumInOUS
eVI ence relatIng to'the prior occurrence, and not part of
the res gestae b~t remote by forty-three days, admissible
when ~he conn~ctIOn of the occurrence with the defendant
and Wlt~ the crIme charged is shown only by a theory f th
prosecutIOn. based upon circuInstantial evidence, and th~ evi~
dence relatIng to the crime charged is Is
I cI'rcuma 0 pure y
stan tial ?

d

lIt .is evident that the admission of this volume of evidence
;~ at~ng to the suspicious circumstances which Occurred on
e mght of Aug~st 30th was prejudicially erroneous. [3] The
general rule, umversally recognized is that I'n
"
I
' for
a
prosecu t'IOn t h e defendant can be tried
no oth crImIna
ff
t~an th~t which he is charged in the indictment ore~n~or::~
t~on; eVIdence of collateral independent crimes is not admi
SIble (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, secs. 343, 344, . 48s
et seq.; 20 Am.Jur., sec. 309, p. 287· 22 C J S sec 6P82
1084 t
8 C I
, . . ",.
P
e seq..: " a .Jur., sec. 167, p. 58 et seq· 13 Cal Ju' .
sec 84 p 703 t
)
.,
. r.,
t"
, '.
e seq.
The equally well recognized excepI~ns to thIS rule are clearly defined. [4] Evidence of th
crImes may be ad 'tt d h
.
0 er
th'
mi e w en It tends directly to establish
e crIme charged by proving a material fact where it is
part of the res. ge~tae, or. where it helps to di;close motive
Intent, premedItatIOn, gUIlty knowledge malic
'
mon pIa
h
(2
, e , or a comn or sc eme 0 Am. Jur., sec. 310 et seq
289 et
,
seq:; 22 C.J.B., sec. 683 et seq. p. 1089 et seq. W·,.P.
EVIde
1 II h
'
. , Igmore on
nce, vo . ,c. XIII, p. 191 et seq.; Wharton's Criminal

3
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Evidence, sec. 345 et seq., p.487 et seq.; 8 Cal.Jur., sec. 168
et seq., p. 60 et seq.; 13 Cal.Jur., sec. 84 et seq., p. 703et seq.)
[5] The trial court, however, should be guided by the rule
that such proof is to be received with "extreme caution,"
and if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly
perceived, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accuf;ed,
instead of suffering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced
by an independent fact, c.arrying with it no proper evidence
of the particular guilt. (People v. Lane (1893), 100 Oat
379, 387-390 [34 P. 856] ; 13 Cal.Jur., sec. 84, p. 707; 8 Cal.
Jur., sec. 168, p. 61.) '1'he textwriter explains the limited
application of the exceptions to the general rule in these
words (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, sec. 360, p. 567):
"Certain condition:'! must always exist as a predicate to the
admission of evidence of other crimes. Such evidence, being
a departure from the general rule of exclusion, is only admitted to render more certain the ascertainment of the exact
truth as to the charge under trial. In any loose relaxation
of the rule, the danger to the accused is that evidence may
be adduced of offenses that he has not yet been called upon
to defend, of which, if fairly tried, he might bc able to acquit
himself.
"In the first place, the collateral offense for which an
accused has not been tried tends to prove his inclination
towards crime, that is, to render morc probable his guilt
of the charge under trial, which is an absolute violation of
the rule. It does not reflect in any degree upon the intelligence, integrity, or the honesty of purpose of the juror
that matters of a prejudicial character find a permanent
lodgment in his mind, which will, inadvertently and unconsciously, enter into and affect his verdict. The juror does
not possess that trained and disciplined mind which enables
him either closely or judicially to discriminate between that
which he is permitted to consider and that which he is not.
Because of this lack of training, he is unable to draw conclusions entirely uninfluenced by the irrelevant prejudicial
matters within his knowledge....
"A man may fully recover from the effects of judicial
tribulation where it affects only his property or material interests. But recovery from the effects of a charge that involves his reputation and character, and that threatens his
liberty or his life, is a recovery only in name. Absolute
a3 C.24-18
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acquittal cannot completely restore him to the place he once
held. The stain of prosecution cannot be eradicated. These
momentous consequences demand a rigorous enforcement of
the rule, in criminal charges, that evidence of the collateral
offense must never be admitted, unlesE. it can be applied to
more certainly demonstrate the truth. Hence: (a) Ground
must first be laid implicating the accused in the charge under
trial, and unless sufficient evidence of this has been, in the
opinion of the trial judge, fi~st adduced, all evidence of
other offenses must be excluded; (b) the collateral offense
cannot be put in evidence without proof that the accused
was concerned in its commission; (c) there must be identity of person or crime, scienter, intent, system, Or some
integral parts of the exceptions established between the
charge under trial and that sought to be introduced, that
clearly connects the accused, showing that the person who
committed the one crime must have committed the other. In
other words, some connection between the other crime and
the crime charged must be shown, and it must be shown with
reasonable certainty that the accused committed the other
crime. "
[6] In the present case the evidence of the events of August
30th obviously failed to satisfy the requirements set forth
as (b) and (c) in the above quotation. At most it showed
that defendant's account of his whereabouts on that night
was considered incredible by the police, and that defendant,
or his car, might or might not have been by the Kmetz home.
It was insufficient to create more than a mere suspicion that
defendant might have been the assailant of Kmetz. More-.
over, it was placed before the jury under an instruction which
was clearly erroneous, and failed to bring it within any of
the recognized exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility. This instruction, already quoted herein, told the jury
that "the defendant is not on trial in this case for any crime
connected with an assault upon John Kmetz on or about the
30th of August, 1941. The evidence with regard to the
transactions of August 30th, 1941, are to be considered by
you only as the same may relate to the matter of the relationship of the defendant to John Kmetz, the matter of premeditation, the matter of malice or the matter of motive.
Such evidence may not be considered by you for any other
purpose. "
[7] This instruction was erroneous and misleading, and it
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invaded the province of the jury in that it was unqualified
by any statement that before the jurors could consider the
testimony for the specified purposes, they must conclude, first,
that Kmetz was in fact assaulted on the night of Au.gust
30th and, second, that defendant was in fact the assaIlant
of John Kmetz on that night.
.
Separately considering the elements referred to In the
instruction it will be seen that the evidence as to the assault
tended to ~rove nothing at all with respect "to the matter
of the relationship of the defendant to John Kmetz," for
no relationship between them other than a fr~endl;r o?e was
shown and there was no evidence whatsoever IdentIfYIng defendant as the assailant. As to "motiv'El" there was no proof
whatsoever. That the victim may have been assaulted by
someone some six weeks before he was poisoned adds ~oth-,
ing to the bare fact that no motive was revealed for ~Ither
act. Without identification of defendant a.s the, ,assaIlan~,
the assault evidence did not tend to show eIther premedItation" or "malice." Furthermore, these two elements were
established by the receipt of the poisoned capsules, and no
strength was given to that conclusive showing by proof of
merely suspicious occurrences, not part of the ~es gestae,
which proof would in any event at most b~ cumulatIve. Other
elements, not mentioned in the instructIon but r.eferred ~
in the briefs are likewise not involved. The eVIdence dId
not tend to p~ove any "common plan or scheme' 'on the part
of defendant; it showed no "gui~ty .knowledge" and no
"material fact" concerning the pOIsomng. The occurrence
was remote in time, and not, part of t~e res gestae. As to
"identity" or "intent" it was insuffiCIent to do more than
arouse cumulative suspicions.
.
.
[8] It is true that where evidence of a pnor offense 18 pro'!?arly admissible under the exceptions to the genera] rule" It
is not necessary to prove all of the elements of that offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be the case were .the
defendant standing trial for it as well as for the crIme
charged. (People v. Lisenba (1939), 14 Cal.2d 403, 429432 [94 P .2d 569], and cases there reviewed.) But the proof
must nevertheless be sufficient to arouse more than mere s,?spicion· it must afford "substantial evidence" that the prIor
offens~ was in fact committed by the defendant. (People v.
Lisenba, S1tpm; Scott v. State (1923), 107 Ohio St: 47,5 [141
N.E. 19, 26J, overruling Baxter v. State l 91 OhlO St. 167
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[110 N.E. 456] ; State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200 [136 S.W. 316,
Ann.Cas. 1912D 191]; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, sec.
366, p. 584; 20 Am.Jur., sec. 318, p. 299; 3 A.L.R. 784-786;
22 C.J.S., sec. 690, p. 1112; Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 338
Pa. 65 [12 A.2d 317, 325] ; State v. Ebel, 92 1lfont. 413 [15
P.2d 233].)
To thus emphasize the degree of proof required, varying
terms have been used for guidance of the trial court. "The
evidence which can be so used cf other crimes presupposes
that the other crime is prima facie established by competent
proof" (Commonwealth v. Petrillo, supra, at p. 325), "To
render such evidence admissible, it must be shown that it
substantially establishes the defendant's guilt as to such
other crime . . . or, in other words, it must be shown with
reasonable certainty that the accused committed the other
crime. . . . " (State v. Ebel, sttpra, at p. 237.) " ... The
degree of proof required in this class of testimony is held
on excellent authority to be positive or substantial, but not
'beyond a reasonable doubt.''' (Scott v. State, supra, at p.
26; see State v. Hyde, supra, 234 Mo. at p. 250, 136 N.W. at
p. 331.) "Before evidence of the commission of other crimes
by accused is admitted, the trial court should satisfy itself
that the evidence substantially establishes the other crimes,
clear and convincing proof, and the making out of at least
a prima facie case, being required; evidence of a vague and
uncertain character, offered for the purpose of showing that
the accused has been guilty of similar offenses, should not
be admitted under any pretense whatever, nor is mere susHpicion, or proof of a suspicious circumstance, sufficient. So,
before guilty intent may be inferred from other similar
crimes, they must be established by evidence which is legal
and competent and plain, clear and conclusive. . . . " (22
C.J.S., sec. 690, p. 1112.)
Here, the fact that the circumstantial evidence of the
prior merely suspicious occurrences was adduced in great
quantity so that it comprises a large part of the voluminous
record, cannot serve as a substitute for "substantiality"
where none exists. This erroneously admitted proof shows,
if anything, that it must by very reason of its voluminousness have tended to confuse the jurors and warp their judgment. [9] Circumstantial proof of a crime charged cannot be
intermingled with circumstantial proof of suspicious prior
occurrences in such manner that it reacts as 11 psychological
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factor with the result that the proof of the crime charged is
used to bolster up the theory or foster suspicion in the mind
th~t the defendant must have committed the prior act, and
the conclusion that he must have committed the prior act
is then used in turn to strengthen the theory and induce
the conclusion that he must also have committed the crime
charged. This is but a vicious circle. Here the ev:idence of
suspicious prior occurrences affords no subs.tantml proof
whatsoever connecting defendant in any way wIth the charge
on which he was tried.
The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed,
and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-I agree with the conclusion
in the majority opinion that it was prejudicial error to admit
the evidence with regard to the assault of August 30, 1941.
This evidence, in my opinion, was insufficient to enable a
reasonable jury to conclude that it was more probable that
defendant committed the assault than that he did not.
There were other prejudicial errors that constitute additional reasons for reversing the judgment. There was, first,
the readina' from the transcript of defendant's testimony at
the former'" trial and the subsequent oontradiction of that testimony by witnesses called by the prosecution. If the tes~i. mony of a witness at the first trial of ~ case does not contam
assertions concerning material facts, it is irrelevant at a second trial and therefore inadmissible. Even if the witness
testified to material facts, his declarations at the first trial
are hearsay at the second trial and not admissible under section 1870(8) of the Code of Civil Procedure unless "the witness is deceased, or out of the jurisdiction, or unable to
testify." None of these reasons exists in the present case.
The admission of this testimony, therefore, was not proper
unless permitted under other exceptions to the hearsay rule.
False statements by a defendant to those investigating the
commission of the crime are admissible if they indicate consciousness of guilt. Although hearsay, they are receivable
as admissions and are proveable because they are regarded
as assertions by the accused tending to show guilt. Thus,
such statements have been held adlllissible because they in-
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volved an attempt by the accused to establish a false alibi
(People v. Miller, 19 Cal.App.2d 708 [66 P.2d 448]), the
giving of false explanations for the possession of goods allegedly stolen (People v. Oox, 29 Cal.App. 419 [155 P. 1010] ;
People v. Martin, 16 Cal.App.2d 515 [60 P.2d 1014]), the
denial by a defendant that he knew his codefendant, immediately subsequent to the wrecking by that codefendant of a
stolen car in which the defendant was a passenger (People
v. Z'abriski, 135 Cal.App. 169 [26 P.2d 511]), and the denial
by defendant that he had delivered carpets to a thief when
the question was whether the carpets had been delivered
innocently or as part of a scheme to defraud (People v. Oole,
141 Cal. 88 [74 P. ,547]). Similarly, in People v. Arnold,
43 Mich. 303 [5 N.W. 385, 38 Am.Rep. 182], the falsehood
,consisted of a fictitious reason for being present at the scene
of the crime.
It has never been suggested, however, that every falsehood
voiced by the defendant between the time of the crime and
the trial can be admitted on this basis, for it is well known
that all persons are liable to make errors in the description of
past events. Consciousness of guilt is proved, not by evidence of such slips, but by fabrications which, like devious
alibis, are apparently motivated by fear of detection, or which,
,like devious explanations of the possession of stolen goods,
suggest that there is no honest explanation for incriminating
circumstances ap,d thus are admissions of guilt. Before evi, dence of false statements by a defendant may be received,
the cou,rt must determine whether the falsehood is one that
may be rel;\sonably construed as implying such an admission;
otherwise evidence might be received that is in no way relevant to the issues and therefore seriously prejudicial to the
defendant because it indicates to the jury that he is a dishonest person.
The errors proved by the prosecution in the present case
have none of the characteristics of such admissions. From
the transcript of defendant's testimony at the former trial,
it appeared that defendant answered "No" when asked
whether he had said to one of the officers in the course of the
investigation, "I did not pass any opinion on the man
(Kmetz) outside of that he was twenty years older and that
he had two children, and that if she wanted to consider these
things, if she actually loved the man there was no objection."
Defendant answered "Yes" when asked whether he had told
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any of the officers investigating the case of a conversation he
had described with 0 'Connor, the person who he alleged had
robbed him of his car and clothes at the time of the assault
on Kmetz, to the effect that 0 'Connor had worked as a railwayman. He expressed considerable doubt, however, as to
which officer he had spoken of the conversation but indicated
that it might have been Officer Bowers. After the transcript
was read, Officer Bowers took the stand and testified that
defendant had not described this conversation to him but
had made the statement set forth concerning Kmetz. Parts
of the transcript were also read containing an admission by
defendant that he had filled out an application for a job
stating falsely the extent of his education as well as a statement by defendant that he knew no one named Crocker, which
was followed by testimony, induced by the exhibit of one of
defendant's notebooks, that he knew a woman named Hedwig
Crocker, aged ninety.
These errors were not indicative of consciousness of guilt.
It is irrevelant that defendant made out a false employment
application and could not remember a Mrs. Crocker. A
guilty person would have no reason to withhold the statement concerning the age of Kmetz, for such a statement is
one that any friend of the girl might make. The statement
that "if she actually loved the man there was no objection"
does not indicate any hostility to the deceased. Defendant's
assertion that he had told Officer Bowers of his conversation
with 0 'Connor cannot reasonably be regarded as an admission of guilt, particularly in view of his doubt ,as to whether
he had or had not mentioned the matter to Officer Bowers.
There was, therefore, no legitimate ground for the admission of this evidence. Its admission permitted the prosecution to do indirectly what it could not do directly, namely,
attack the character of the accused for veracity, a trait that,
unless he takes the stand, is not involved in a trial for murder and is therefore not a proper subject of inquiry. (People
v. Burke, 18 Cal.App. 72 [122 P. 435] ; People v. McMillan,
59 Cal.App. 785 [212 P. 38] ; People v. Derrick, 85 Cal.App.
406 [259 P. 481] ; People v. Peterson, 120 Cal.App 197 [7
P.2d 366] ; see 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., p. 438.)
In addition, evidence was introduced that several of the
police officers told defendant they did not believe his story
when he described how 0 'Connor took his car and clothes.
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These declarations were hearsay (People v. Yeager, 1D4 Cal.
452, 486 [229 P. 40]) and expressions of opinion on the
part of the officers. Had defendant remained silent when
the officers expressed these opinions, they might have been
admitted on the theory that defendant conceded their truth
by his silence. He protested, however, that his story was
true, and there was therefore no ground for admitting the
officers' declarations. (People v. Teshara., 134 Cal. 542 [66
P. 798] ; People v. Lapara, 181 Cal. 66 [183 P. 545] ; People
v. Yeager, supra; People v. Ayhens, 16 Cal.App. 618 [117 P.
789] ; People v. Wilson,61 Cal.App. 611 [215 P. 565].)
The trial court erred again when, of its own volit.ion, it
instructed the jury as follows: "You are further instructed
that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled
.to be a witness against himself, and that the defendant in
this case has the privilege of declining to take the witness
stand and testify. The Const.itution of the State of California
provides as follows: 'In any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, hi~ failure to explain or to deny by
his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him
may be COtnlllented upon by the court and by counsel, and
may be considered by the court or the jury.' Constitution
of California, Article I, section 130"
This instructionwM prejudicially erroneous, for it imposed no limitations on the jury as to what consideration
it could give defendant's failure to testify and left the jury
free to infer guilt from that fact alone. 'rhe jury is not
free under, the constitutional provision to give defendant's
failure to testify any cOllsideration it sees fit, any more than
court or counsel are free to make any comment thereon. they
see fit. (See People v. Oftey, 5 Ca1.2d 714, 724 [56 P.2d
193].) Before the constitutional amendment it was error
to comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand or
to advise the jury that it. could draw inferences unfavorable
to him on that a0count. (People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522.) The
constitutional aruendment changes the rule of the Tyler case
and permits such comment but does not do more. It does
not relieve the prosecution of the burden of establishing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by cOIllpetent evidence.
(People v. Sawaya, 46 Cal.App.2d 466, 471 [115 P.2d 1001].)
If the prosecution fails to meet this burden, the jury cannot
infer guilt from the failure of the defendant to take the
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stand. If, however, the prosecution has introduced competent evidence on every element of the crime, the jury, in
weighing the evidence and drawing inferences therfrom, may
consider the defendant's failure to explain evidence against
him that he could reasonably be expected to explain. Under
such circumstances, the jury may weigh the evidence most
heavily against the accused and draw reasonable inferences
that may be unfavorable to him.
Even where the prosecution has introduced evidence on
every essential element of the crime, however, it is not fair
to the accused to leave the jury free, under a general instruction like that in question, to give the defendant's failure to
testify whatever consideration it sees fit. There is then no
protection to the accused against the jury's weighing the
evidence most heavily against him and drawing unfavorable
inferences from his failure to explain matters of which he
could not reasonably be expected to have cognizance. The
failure of the accused to testify derives significance from the
presence of evidence that he might "explain or deny by his
testimony, " for it may be inferred that if he had an explanation he would have given it, or that if the evidence were
false he would have denied it. (See Code Civ. Proc., sec.
1963, subds. 5 and 6.) No such inferences, however, can
reasonably be drawn from the silence of the accused concerning matters outside his knowledge. The New Jersey Supreme Court, which has always allowed comment on the
failure of the accused to testify, has recognized that "His
failure to offer himself as a witness when his testimony could
not meet or disprove any particular fact or circumstance ...
probably ought not to affect him, and if so, his silence
should not be commented on or considered." (Parker v.
State, 61 N.J.L. 308 [39 A. 651, 653]. See, also, State v.
Wines, 65 N.J.L. 31 [46 A. 702] ; State v. Howard, 83 N.J.L.
636 [87 A. 436]; State v. Rubenstein, (N.J.Sup.) 136 A.
597.)
If the defendant had taken the stand he would not have
been obliged to explain matters for which he could not reasonably be regarded as having an explanation. Thus, in
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 [37 S.Ct. 192, 61
L.Ed. 442], holding that when the defendant took the stand
the trial court could properly call the attention of the jury
to his failure to explain matters that he could explain, the

586

PEOPLE

v.

ALBERTSON

[23 C.2d

court was careful to note that the trial court "did not put
upon the defendant the burden of explaining every inculpat?ry fact S?own or claimed to be established by the prosecution. The mference waa to be drawn from the failure of the
accused to meet evidence as to those matters within his own
k.n?wledge and as to events in which he was an active partICIpant and fully able to speak when he voluntarily took the
stand in his own behalf." If a defendant who takes the
stand is not obliged to explain matters that he cannot reasonably be expected to explain, a fortiori a defendant who
does not take the stand is not obliged to explain such matters.
~en.~ jurs: is instructed in general terms that it may
c?nslder the failure of the accused to take the stand, it is
likely to regard his silence as indicating the truth of testimony.other than that relating to matters within his knowledge, It may .even assume that innocent people take the
stand and that .defendant is guilty because he did not. Since
a conviction must be supported by something more substantial than silence, it is essential that the jury be instructed
as to the limitations upon the consideration that it may give
a defendant's failure to testify.
. The court also erred in instructing the jury substantially
m t?e language of. Penal Code section 1105 that, "Upon
a .trIal. for murder, the burden of proving circumstances of
mItigation or that justify it devolves upon the defendant."
'. T~e burden of proof is usually twofold. The party bearIl;lg It faces a burden of persuasion, sometimes called "the
rIsk of non-persuasion." This means that the issue must be
determined against him if the evidence does not convince
the trier of fact that it is more probable than not that the
facts are as he represents them. (See 9 Wigmore on Evi.
dence, 3d ed., sec. 2486.) He also usually has the burden
?f going forward with the evidence, for if no evidence is
mtr~du,ced a verdict must be directed against him. (See
9 WIgmore on Evidence, 3d ed., sec. 2487.) In several early
case~ this cou:t held that the burden placed on defendant by
sectIOn 1105 mcluded both these burdens and required the
defendant to prove circumstances of mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476;
People v. Hong Ah puck, 61 Cal. 387; People v. Raten, 63
Cal. 421, 422; but see People v. West, 49 Cal. 610.) Subsequently, however, these decisions were overruled (People v.
Bushton, 80 Cal. 160 [22 P. 127, 549]) and it haa since been
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uniformly held that an instruction requiring proof of circumstances of mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence
is erroneous. It has been said that defendant is required
only to produce enough evidence of such circumstances to
raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. (People v. Bushton,
supra; People v. Elliott, 80 Cal. 296 [22 P. 207] ; People v.
Post, 208 Cal. 433 [281 P. 618] ; People v. Madison, 3 Cal.2d
668, 676 [46 P.2d 159] ; People v. Marshall, 112 Cal. 422 [44
P. 718]; see People v. Wells, 10 Ca1.2d 610, 622 [76 P.2d
493] .)
However illogical it is to impose on a defendant the
burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to his guilt when
the prosecution already has the burden of proving his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, these decisions unquestionably
have the effect of relieving the defendant of the burden of
persuasion. The duty imposed by section 1105, therefore, is
solely that of going forward with the evidence, of introducing evidence of circumstances of mitigation. (See 9 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 405.) The code section thus lIas the effect merely of
freeing the prosecution of the risk of a directed verdict in
favor of the defendant. (People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171, 178,
et seq. [54 P. 833]; see 9 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed.,
secs. 2487, 2512.) If, however, the jury is instructed in the
language of section 1105, it is likely to amplify the effect of
the section by concluding that it must decide that mitigating circumstances do not exist unless the defendant convinces it that the existence of such circumstances is more
probable than not. An instruction in such language is therefore erroneous. (People v. Oars on , 43 Cal.App.2d 40 [110
P.2d 98].)
An instruction in the language of a statute is proper only
if the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the
statute without guidance from the court. (See Formosa v.
Yellow Oab 00., 31 Cal.App.2d 77 [87 P.2d 716] ; New York
&; P. R. S. S. 00. v. M'Gowin Lumber &; E. 00., (CCA 8th)
284 F. 513.) It is not proper if reasonable men might differ
as to the construction of the statute, for it would delegate
to the jury the function of statutory interpretation that belongs to the court. (Kansas Oity etc. Ry. v. Becker, 63 Ark.
477 [39 S.W. 358] ; see People v. Ghysels, 81 Cal.App. 122
[252 P. 1067]; People v. Pagni, 69 Cal.App. 94 [230 P.
1001]; 1 Reid's Branson, Instruction to Juries (1936) p.
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217.) The history of section 1105 in this court makes it clear
that a jury would not understand the section without guidance. Judicial interpretation has attributed to it a meaning
not apparent from its. language, and an instruction that fails
to convey that interpretation is misleading and therefore
erroneous. (See 14 R.C.L. 772.)
It has sometimes been held that if the jury is also instructed that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, an instruction in the language of section
1105 is not prejudicial. (See People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648
[33 P. 791]; People v. Richards, 1 Cal.App. 566 [82 P. 691].)
If the instruction as to reasonable doubt is made expressly
applicable to the. evidence of mitigating circumstances (see
People v. Riohards, supra) this conclusion is correct. If the
instruction is phrased in general terms, however (see People
v~ Hopper, 42 Cal.App. 499 [183 P. 836] ; People v. Leddy,
95 CaLApp. 659 [273 P. 110]), a reasonable jury might
easily conclude that section 1105 creates an exception to the
rule that if a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt appears he must be acquitted, believing that mitigating circumstances have not been proved when it has merely been
shown that it is not certain beyond a reasonable doubt
whether they exist. (See People v. Marshall, 112 Cal. 422
[44 P~ 718].) Cases such as People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592 [91
P. 515] ; People v. Wilt, 173 Cal. 477 [160 P. 561] j People
v. McClure, 148 Cal. 418 [83 P. 437] ; and People v. A.ttema,
·75 Cal.App. 642 [243 P. 461], concerned with other criticisms of the use of the literal language of section 1105, do
not establish the validity of such an instruction against the
objection now urged. The case of People v. Burdg, 95 Cal.
App.259 [272 P. 816], making a contrary assumption, should
be disapproved.
It may be contended that in the present case this instruction was not prejudicial because there was no evidence of mitigating circumstances. It has been recognized,
however, that if there is no evidence of such circumstances
an instruction under section 1105 is apt to confuse the jury
and may therefore be ground for reversal. (People v. Tapia,
131 Cal. 647 [63 P. 1001]:) The jury can hardly be aware
that this instruction, formally declared by the court as the
law applicable to the case, is irrelevant. In dutifully attempting to apply it to the evidence, it may have found
siillffi.cant the words ' 'the commission of the homicide by
i;

<
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defendant being proved," and taken them to indicate the
court's belief that this much has been proved. (People
v. Tapia, supra. ) It is also likely that the jury failed to observe that proof of "the commission of the homicide by defendant" must precede the application of the instruction,
and concluded that the instruction placed the burden of proving some facts on the defendant and some on the prosecution,
thus depriving defendant of his right to have the prosecution prove all material facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Such
an error is made the more serious by use of the statutory
language, giving the jury the impression that defendant was
bound to prove such facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
There was no justification for this instruction in the a bRence
of evidence of mitigating circumstances, for the question of
defendant's guilt depended solely on whether or not he committed the homicide, and the jury should therefore have been
given no instructions that did not relate to the determination
of that question. In some cases it may be reasonable to suppose that the jury ignored an instruction of this kind. (See
People v. Wilt, supra.) The verdict in the present case, however, in view of the uncertainty of the cIrcumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution and its failure to prove
any motive for the killing, suggests that the jury may well
have been influenced by the court's error.
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-Considering the great mass
of substantial evidence pointing unerringly to appellant as
the perpetrator of the cunningly conceived but awkwardly
executed murder of John Kmetz, I cannot justify on any
logical or rational basis the labored effort of the majority
opinion to belittle the testimony which connects Albertson
with the commission of the crime.
The fact that evidence is circumstantial does not detract
from its probative value. The law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. Whether the evidence is of the one kind or the other, the same degree of
proof is required and the final test of its sufficiency is the
same: does the whole evidence together satisfy the minds of
the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the
charge? (People v. Parohen, 37 Cal.App.2d 215, 222 [98 P.2d
1045] i People v. Murray, 41 Cal. 66, 67.) Circumstantial
evidence may be as conclusive in its convincing force as the
testimony of witnesses to the overt act (People v. Perkins, 8
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Ca1.2d 502, 511 [66 P.2d 631] ; People v. Nagy, 199 Cal. 235,
236 [248 P. 906]) j indeed, it often leads to a conclusion
more satisfactory than direct evidence can produce (People
v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142); consequently where the circumstances proved reasonably justify the conclusion of the jury
expressed in its verdict, a reviewing court may not interfere
with the determination. (People v. Latona, 2 Ca1.2d 714 [43
P.2d 260].)
From the evidence presented by the prosecution the jury
and the trial judge concluded that Albertson is guilty of the
crime charged against him. In an attempt to minimize the
damning effe'(t of this evidence, my associates state that it
is "entirely circumstantial"; that "no motive whatsoever
is shown"; that there is no proof that appellant ever "purchased or otherwise procured the poison," or that the poison
was inserted in two of the capsules prior to mailing, or that
the .contents of the capsules "were not changed or tampered
with" after they were received at the Kmetz home. They also
state that if appellant had poisoned the capsules "it seems
improbable that he would have left so wide and open a trail" ;
also, if appellant did prepare and mail the capsules "but
unknown to him two of them were poisoned by another, this
would logically explain the openness with which he conducted
his early activities and a later attempt to conceal and deny
them." These are all matters of argument more properly
presentable to a jury and entirely outside of the province of
an appellate court which, under elementary rules, must affirm
a judgment based upon substantial evidence. Concerning the
several matters referred to in the majority opinion as not
being covered by the evidence, it was for the jury to decide
"what circumstances were essential to satisfy their minds beyond all reasonable doubt of . . . [appellant's] guilt, and
thus constitute necessary links of such chain." (People v.
Wilt, 173 Cal. 477, 485 [160 P. 561] ; People v. Ah Jake, 91
. Cal. 98 [27 P. 595].)
An appellate court is not concerned with the weight of
the evidence, but will only consider whether it includes facts
justifying an inference of guilt by the jury. If the evidence
reasonably supports that inference, the judgment must stand,
although the facts presented to the jury might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant. (People v. Newland, 15 Ca1.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778].) The court
must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every
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fact which the jury reasonably could have inferred or deduced from the evidence. (People v. Newland, supl'a, at p. 681;
People v. Perkins, "Supra; People v. Parch en, supra.)
Kmetz received the box of poison capsules less than two
months after he married the woman who for six years had
been an intimate acquaintance and frequent companion of
Albertson. The association of Esther Dockham and Albertson commenced when they spent much time together preparing questions and answers on religious topics, and
continued after her marriage to Kmetz to almost the very
hour when the capsules were sent to the bridegroom. For
on the late afternoon of the same day the poison package
was mailed, Albertson called for the bride in his automobile
and took her away for the week end.
.
Tending to show that Albertson sent the capsules In a
box which he made for that purpose, and also procured and
mailed the inducing letter which was delivered with it, is
substantial evidence from which his guilt reasonably may be
inferred. Read as a whole it convincingly points to him as
the person who carried out the poison plan. Briefly summarized, it shows:
1. The two-page letter which accompanied the capsules
was typewritten on letterheads printed upon an order place~,
twenty days prior to the death of Kmetz, by a man w,ho p~Id
cash for them. Although the printer was unable to IdentIfy
Albertson as the man who had ordered the letterheads, any
doubt that he was that man would seem to be dissipated by
other evidence which positively connects him with the literature of "The Herb Specialty Co.," an imaginary company
with the address of a vacant building.
2 When the printer delivered the letterheads, he referred
the' purchaser to the Letter Shop in Santa Monica for multiO'raphing. On the same day a man appeared at the Letter
Shop with letterheads of "~he Herb Specialty. Co." and
ordered a two-page letter wrItten from copy whIch he submitted. The employee who took this order testified th~t
Albertson very closely resembled the man for whom she dId
the work and the letter written by her was identified as the
one that accompanied the poisoned capsules mailed to Kmetz.
This employee informed the customer that if many ~opies of
the letter were desired she would recommend that It be reduced in length and then mimeographed.
3. Eight days later a man came to the same Letter Shop
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and ordered 500 one-page letters to be mimeographed on the
letterheads of "The Herb Specialty Co." He called for them
on the following morning. The proprietress positively identified appellant as the man who placed this order and called
for the mimeographed letters. The employee of the Letter
Shop, who eight days earlier had typed the two-page letter
which accompanied the capsules to Kmetz, also testified that
she later cut the mimeograph stencil from the copy of the
one-page letter that had been left with the proprietress for
mimeographing, and that she then saw the one-page letter
being run from the stencil cut by her on to stationery of "The
Herb Specialty Co." The one-page letter is a condensation
of the subject matter of the longer one.
.
4. Three days prior to the death of Kmetz, a man appeared at the office of a public stenographer and notary
public in Hollywood and requested her to address 21 envelopes to the persons whose names appeared on a sheet of paper
furnished by him. When called as a witness she identified an
envelope addressed to John Kmetz, bearing a return address
of "The Herb Specialty Co.," as one of the envelopes she
had written for the man. The envelope contained the twopage letter which accompanied the poison box to Kmetz. This
witness positively identified Albertson as the man for whom
she did the work.
5. A client of the public stenographer, who was in her
office when the envelopes were written, testified he was "80
per cent" sure that Albertson was the man he saw there at
that time.
6. Two. handwriting experts testified that, in their opinions, the signature of the "doctor" appearing on the twopage letter accompanying the poison box to Kmetz was in
the handwriting of the appellant. They reached this conclusion after comparison with and study. of exemplars of Al. bertsol!. 's handwriting~
In addition to this uncontradicted testimony definitely
connecting Albertson with the nonexistent "Herb Specialty
Co., " whose name appeared on the poison box, there is other
evidence equally substantial and persuasive which poinUi to
Albertson as the sender of the capsules received by Kmetz.
He is a blacksmith by trade, and cyanide is used in tempering steel. It also appears that cyanogas is the trade name
for calcium cyanide. It may be purchased in any drug, feed,
or hardware store without a prescription or the signing of a
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poison register, and is composed of small particles of about
the same color (dark gray) and form as the content of the
two capsules taken by Kmetz.
During the first week of June, 1941, Albertson came ~o
Miss Dockham's home in Los Angeles and took her to hIS
trailer-tent home in San Pedro. He had been out of work
for some time and was attending a W.P.A. welding school
in San Pedro. Miss Dockham was not feeling well and she
asked Albertson to get her some vitamin capsules. ;~ose he
procured were marketed under t.he name ?f Pro-;, I~e .and
came in a bright orange box WhICh she saId was .slmllar,
if not identical both as to appcarance, make, extenor and
interior" with one which was received in evidence. By August she had taken most of the tablets and left the box in the
trailer when she returned to Los Angeles for the opening of
school.
One of the handwriting experts examined the. construction of the small box which went through the mall and expressed the opinion that "the paper pasted on the top and
bottom was not as it came from the factory. It looked to me
like a home made job of pasting . . . the interior of the box
was not factory made or factory assembled but was. assembled
in a somewhat amateurish manner." More speCIfically, he
pointed out that the pasteboard trays in the. Pro-Vite box
identified by Mrs. Kmetz are of the same thlClmess as the
ones in tl1 e box mailed under the name of "The Herb Specialty Co." and that the holes in each showed the same workmanship. Also, the holes in the trays of each box are of the
same size and the same distance apart. He found that the
holes in the trays of the Pro-Vite box are not exactly spaced,
and demonstrated to the jury that an area, and only one
area on the tray taken from it very accurately matches an
area' of the.one in the box received by Kmetz.
The forensic chemist of the police department corroborated this testimony and also gave the results of his microscopic examination of the two boxes. He found that the
cardboard stock in each is the same and that the small one
carries some indication of the bright color of the one which
came from the drug store. Of even mor.e significance is his
testimony that an analysis of tiny partIcles of paste take~
from the upper tray of the small box showed the same chen:Ical content as the mucilage which was found by officers III
the Albertson trailer Oll October 22nd. And he also told the
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jury that on the rubber squeegee of this mucilage bottle he
found traces of the color of the drug store box.
Certainly this evidence does not justify the implications
of the majority opinion that the jury reasonably could not
have .dElduced from the. voluminous testimony any or all of
!he CIrcumstances mentIoned as not being covered by it. To
Illustrate: The statement that there is no evidence to show
that the capsules were not tampered with after being received
at the Kmetz home entirely ignores facts shown in connection
with them. The package in which they were received bore
the name of a fictitious company, with directions on part of
a letterhead of this mythical organization and there came
with it a descriptive and inducing letter si~ned by an imaginary" doctor." This letter was traced to the appellant and
handwriting experts testified that the "doctor's" signature
was. made by him. The majority opinion also ignores the
testImony of the daughter of Kmetz, who saw the package
opened by he~ ~ather on October 11, 1941, and described it
as then. ~ontalUlUg two dark and ten light-colored capsules.
At the. tIme Kmetz tool, the capsules, his widow testified, the
box still contained two dark and ten light-colored capsules.
~ompliance with the enclosed directions suggesting the taklUg of "2 Dark Capsules at bedtime" resulted in the death
of Kmetz. Certainly this evidence reasonably supports the
j~ry's implied finding that the capsules were not tampered
WIth at the Kmetz home or elsewhere after leaving the hands
of the sender.
•
My associates have also usurped the functions of the
jury in asserting that "no motive whatsoever is shown" for
appellant's commission o~ the homicide. Preliminarily, it
sho.uld be stated that whIle proof of motive is always ma~erlal, and th.e abse~ce of mot~ve. may be considered by the
Jury on the SIde of mnocence, It IS not an essential factor in
the proof of a cr~me. If from the evidence tending to connect appellant WIth the capsules and the literature which
came with them the jurors believed he sent the poison to
Kmetz, it was not necessary, in order for them to render a
verdict of guilty, to find a motive which led him to do so.
(People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387, 390-391 [281 P. 609] ; People
v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315, 328 [184 P. 389].)
But there is an answer of fact, as well as of law to the
argument of the majority opinion. Motive is the thouO'ht
that impels one to act; it is the product of human relati~n-
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ships and environment, follows no general pattern and very
often cannot be accounted for upon any analysis of logical
human behavior. Conditions which induce one person to act
in a particular way have no effect whatever upon another.
Often there is no understandable basis for certain conduct.
The present case, however, is not one of that class in which
there is no evidence to show motive. Certainly in the relations of Esther Dockham and the Albertsons for six years,
and the part John Kmetz played in them for a few brief
months there is much that might have led to criminal conduct. Indeed, that evidence provides substantial support for
concluding that anyone of several motives was the procuring
cause of the murder.
From 1935 when Esther Dockham took a teaching position at San Pedro to the death of Kmetz in 1941, Albertson
and his wife lived in a trailer and a tent house which adjoined it. For some time Miss Dockham lived with them;
after she left San Pedro she frequently returned there for
over night or longer visits. On an unspecified uum~er ~f
occasions Mr. Albertson alone came to Los Angeles m hIS
automobile to take her to San Pedro.
Miss Dockham met Kmetz in September, 1940, and started
"keeping company" with him in January, 1941. For several months she saw him frequently. In either March or
April Miss Dockham wrote a letter to Kmetz in which she
stated she would not go out with him any longer. But evidently Kmetz disregarded her letter and was a persistent
suitor, for afterward he came to see her several times. And
during these and later months of 1941 Miss Dockham was
frequently with Albertson. The first occasion shown by the
evidence was in February or March, 1941, when the treasurer
of the school board was at Miss Dockham's home. Albertson
came to see her and she introduced him as her uncle. The
witness testified that, at the time he left, Albertson's unoccupied car was standing in front of the house.
.
Another witness was a student at the school where MISS
Dockham was teaching in the fall of 1941. He testified that
when she called at his home to deliver his grade card he saw
Albertson alone in his car in front of the house. On another
occasion, the witness said, he saw Albertson and Miss Dockham together at church. Mrs. Albertson was not present and
they drove away together. On several ot.he: occasion~, t~e
boy told the jury, he noticed Albertson sIttmg alone lU biS
car near the school.
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Even after Miss Dockham's marriage to Kmetz she continued her association with Albertson. On at least one occasion he came to the Kmetz house when her husband was
not p.resent. A~d I~metz received the poisoned capsules the
mornmg after hIS wIfe left with Albertson to spend the week
end at San Pedro. She was ready with her bag packed when
Albertson called for her at 5 :00 0 'clock in the afternoon. He
was alone. They made one stop at Gardena on the way to
San Pedro. The next day she and the Albertsons went to
church, at Inglewood, returning to the trailer for dinner.
On Sunday morning she accompanied Albertson to Gardena
on a business errand. They came back to San Pedro and
that evening the Albertsons drove her to Los Angeles.' Two
hours after she arrived ut her house Kmetz took the two dark
capsules. He died shortly afterward.
. The following morning Mrs. Kmetz spent a short time at
the East Los Angeles School, and in the late afternoon she
went to t~e Albertsons in San P.:ldro. Lola, Kmetz' daughter,
accompanIed her. When Mrs. Kmetz and Lola returned to Los
Angeles the next day, the Albertsons went with them and took
up their residence at the East Third Street home. Mrs. Albertson was living there. at the time of the trial. Althougoh the
P{~opl.e y.rere not req~llred to prove It particular, or any, motive
for In~g Kmetz, It was for the jury to determine whether
one mIght be inferred from this and other cvidence
Any discussion of the existence of a possible ~otive for
the homi?ide necessarily mllst also inelude a cOlll'ideration
of th~ eVIdence cuncerning the assault made upon Kmetz on
~e mght of August 30, 1941, twelve days after he had marr~ed Esther Dockham and approximately six weeks prior to
hIS death. At the outset, it may be conceded that this evidence would be incompetent and inadmissible in the prosecution for murder unless it tended to prove some element of or
motive fo: the homicide and likewise tended to connect appellant With the assault. The general rule is that evidence
of other crimes is admissible when it tends to establish motive
intent, absence of accident or mistake, identity, guilty knowl~
edge, or a common scheme or plan (1 Wharton's Criminal
~vidence 490-4~1, se~; 345), and the trial judge accordingly
mstructed the JUry that the defendant is not on trial in
this case for any crime connected with an assault upon John
Kmetz ••• The evidence with regard to .•• [such an at-
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tack is] to be considered by you only as the same may relate
to the matter of the relationship of the defendant to J olm
Kmetz, the matter of premeditation, the matter of malice or
the matter of motive. Snch evidence may not be considered
by you for any other purpose."
The appellant contends that the instruction should have
been qualified by the further statement that before tbis testimonv could be considered the jurors must believe, beyond
any "reasonable doubt, that Albertson committed the assault.
But the law, as recently declared by this court in People v.
Lisenba, 14 Ca1.2d 403, 429-432 [94 P.2d 569], is to the contrary, for it was there held "that evidence which merely
tends to show . . . the commission of other offenses is admissible . . . even though it falls short of proving the corpus
delicti of such other offenses." In the Lisenba case it was
decided that as the prosecution had "made a substantial
showing tending to prove" the prior offense, the trial court
properly admitted what were described as "simply evidentiary facts introduced for the purpose of being considered [by
the jury], together with all of the other evidence in the case
. . . doubtful and otherwise," in its determination of the
ultimate fact. (People v. Lisenba, supl·a.) The majority
opinion, in concluding that the testimony challenged by the
appellant does not amount to "substantial evidence" that he
committed the assault, ignores the settled rules of criminal
procedure and adopts a theory different from that urged by
Albertson.
It is undisputed that shortly after 10 :00 0 'clock on the
night of August 30, 1941, Kmetz was set upon in front of
his home and struck over the head with a pickax handle. The
assailant then ran across a vacant lot east of the Kemtz home,
entered a car parked on McDonnell Avenue, which then moved
south, made a "U" turn to the north, and drove away "as
fast as it could go" without any lights. Before the grand
jury Mrs. Kmetz testified that just prior to the assault she
noticed the parked car and tr,at it looked like the automobile
her "uncle" (appellant) drove. This testimony was read
to her upon the trial to refresh her recollection which in the
interim had become hazy and uncertain. She then testified
that the car parked close to the Kmetz home immediately
preqeding the assault resembled the automobile owned by
Albertson.
There is other evidence tending to connect Albertson with
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this attack. About 10 :15 on the same evening, a car with
one person in it failed to make a boulevard stop in the immedi~te neighborhood and was pursued by a police officer.
After a chase of two miles, the driver of the rapidly fleeing
car abandoned it. This automobile, registered in the name of
M:rs. Albertson, was customarily driven by the appellant. In
it was found, among other things, certain articles of wearing
apparel belonging to Albertson.
Some time after 12 o'clock that night, the appellant, clad
only in hiB underwear, was found by the police about three
miles from the place where the abandoned automobile bad
been found.· He then told the fantastic story narrated in
detail in the majority opinion. It was the province of the
jury to determine from all of the evidence concerning the
attack upon Kmetz, including the testimony of the handwriting experts that Albertson had written the "Crocker"
postcard, whether appellant was the assailant. Had Kmetz
named Albertson as the person who struck him with a club
on the night of August 30th, there would be no question concerning the admissibility of testimony to that effect. As the
record R~OWS that Kmetz was unable to identify his assailant,
the testi.'lnony from which it may very reasonably be inferred
that Albertson was the attacker and, to divert suspicion from
himself, fabricated his, account of the meeting with "0 'Connor" and "Crocker" and the other events of that night, was
equally relevant. The fact that the attack was six weeks
before the death of Kmetz affected the weight, but not the
admissibility, of the evidence, and its purpose was not to
prove Albertson guilty of the assault but to show a motive
for the homicide. Certainly the evidence upon this issue affords a substantial basiB for an inference of motive.
As stated in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence 289 section
246, it iB "always proper for the prosecution to offer evidence of motive, regardless of any collateral effect it may
have in showing, or tending to show, the commission of another offense by the accused. An inquiry in this regard is
often of great importance, particularly in cases of circumstantial evidence." And in People v. Argentos, 156 Cal. 720,
726 [106 P. 65], this court declared: "In a case where the
identity of a person who commits a crime is attempted to be
proven by circumstantial evidence, 8uch as in the case at bar
evidence of a motive on the part of a defendant char.ped i~
always a subject of proof, and the fact of motive partic~larly
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material. In proof of motive the prosecution has a right to
offer any testimony which reasonably and fairly has a tendency to establish it, and we are satisfied that the evidence
which was admitted by the court and of which appellant
complains, was relevant to, and had a logical bearing upon,
the subject. What weight that evidence might have was a
question for the jury, but that it was admissible, notwithstanding it showed the defendant was charged with some
other offense than the one for which he was being tried, and
though its tendency might have been to prejudice him in the
minds of the jury, is not, under the authorities, open to question. (People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216 [46 P. 153].)" (See,
also, People v. Soeder, 150 Cal. 12, 15 [87 P. 1016] ; People
v. Wilson, 117 Cal. 688, 691 [49 P. 1054]; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence 569, sec. 360, and authorities supra.)
Taken as a whole thd evidence points unerringly to Albertson as the person who, actuated by anyone of several
motives, conceived and carried out a thoroughly premeditated
plan to kill the husband of Esther Dockham. The hand of
Albertson is clearly seen in the preparation and mailing of
the letter in the name of "The Herb Specialty Co." There
can be no reasonable doubt whatever that the discarded box
in which the vitamin pills he bought for Esther Dockham
were marketed furnished the design as well as the material
for the vehicle used to carry the poison to Kmetz.
The record shows that the appellant had a fair trial with
full protection of his rights. Oertainly no error is shown
which, after an examination of the entire cause including
the evidence, reasonably suggests that there has been a miscarriage of justice. (Const., art. VI, sec. 4%.)
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment and also
the order denying a new trial should each be affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., and Curtis, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 17,1944. Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., voted
for a rehearing.

